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EGOISM, ALTRUISM, AND MARKET
ILLUSIONS: THE LIMITS OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS
Jeffrey L. Harrison*
Rastafarians,' members of a primarily Jamaican reli-
gious and political movement, use the expression "I and I"
instead of "I," "me," or "my" in daily discourse.2 "I 'n' I,"
as it is pronounced, signifies the unity of the speaker with
God and with other men.3 "I 'n' I" seems very far from the
concept of "self" implicit in neoclassical economics which
assumes man is a "rational maximizer of self-interest. " 4 The
question is: What is the relevant "self" for explaining be-
havior? Is it a narrow self, as in selfish; a self that encom-
passes others based on genetic closeness; 5 a self.based on
* Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.S., University of Florida, 1967;
M.B.A., University of Florida, 1968; Ph.D., University of Florida, 1970; J.D., Uni-
versity of North Carolina, 1977.
I have benefited from the comments of a number of individuals who either
read an earlier draft of this Article or discussed its contents at length. They in-
clude Martin Belsky, Gertrude Block, Charles Carlson, Catherine Damme, Laural
Judd, William Ian Miller, Len Riskin, Christopher Slobogin, Paul Verkuil, Walter
Weyrauch, and Sarah Wilson.
1. It is not possible to describe the Rastafarian movement in a footnote of
reasonable length. Materials to be consulted include L. BARRETT, THE RASTAFARI-
ANS (1977); E. CASHMORE, RASTAMAN, THE RASTAFARIAN MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND
(1983); T. NICHOLAS, RASTAFARI: A WAY OF LIFE (1979); Note, Soul Rebels: The
Rastafarians and the Free Exercise Clause, 72 GEO. L.J. 1605 (1984).
2. See L. BARRET, supra note 1, at 143-45; J. OWENS, DREAD: THE RAS-
TAFARIANS OFJAMAICA 64-68 (1976).
3. See E. CASHMORE, supra note 1, at 135-36; T. NICHOLAS, supra note 1, at
38-40.
4. The assumption includes two components: rationality and self-interest.
See Frolich & Oppenheimer, Beyond Economic Man.: Altruism, Egalitarianism and Dif-
ference Maximizing, 28 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3 (1984). The two parts of this
assumption are discussed more extensively infra text accompanying notes 25-30.
5. See, e.g., R. DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 1-12 (1976); E. WILSON, SocIOBI-
OLOGY 37-63 (1980).
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group solidarity;6 or something with a mystical quality like
the "I 'n' I" self?
The enigmatic character of the "self" and the difficulty
of accurately gauging individual preferences are two
problems to which economists respond by making assump-
tions. Because economic analysis is widely applied to ques-
tions of law and public policy, these assumptions merit
careful analysis. 7 This Article examines whether the econo-
mist's assumption of "self-interest" conforms to the range
of interests that actually influence human behavior. 8 Next, it
questions the assumption that individuals' choices reliably
6. See generally E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 111-229
(1933); Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1967).
7. Commentators have noted the importance of implicit behavioral assump-
tions in the economic analysis of law. See Kelman, Misunderstanding Social Life: A
Critique of the Core Premises of "Law and Economics," 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 274, 274-77
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Kelman, Misunderstanding]; Kornhouser, The Great Im-
age of Authority, 36 STAN. L. REV. 349, 358-64 (1984); Kornhouser, A Guide to the
Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591, 635-37 (1980). Dis-
cussions of these behavioral bases have been infrequent, but insightful. See, e.g.,
Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Common-Law Thought, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 711 (1983); Kelman, Choices and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 769; Kelman,
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 669 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Kelman, Consumption Theory]. For an impor-
tant examination of contract law in the context of the assumptions of neoclassical
economics, see Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U.L. REV.
303 (1983). Four instructive nonlegal sources are: J. ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE
SIRENS (1979); M. LUTZ & K. Lux, THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANISTIC ECONOMICS
(1979); H. MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM AND MORALITY (1982); Sen, Rational
Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
317 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sen, Rational Fools].
8. See infra text accompanying notes 25-211.
I do not specifically consider whether the "rational maximizer" component of
the assumption is valid. As a general matter, sufficient rationality concepts exist
to encompass most behavior. See March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the En-
gineering of Choice, 9 BELLJ. ECON. 587, 591-93 (1978). A particularly interesting
body of literature addresses the concepts of "bounded rationality," see, e.g., H.
SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957); March, supra; Pottinger, Explanation, Rationality,
and Microeconomic Theory, 28 BEHAV. SCI. 109 (1983), and "selective rationality,"
see, e.g., H. LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN (1975); De Alessi, Property Rights,
Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 64
(1983), as alternatives to the traditional rational maximizer concept. For an analy-
sis of alternative rationality concepts in the context of commercial law, see Gil-
lette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contract, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 521 (1985). On rationality issues generally, see M. GODELIER, RATIONALITY
AND IRRATIONALITY IN ECONOMICS (1972); M. HOLLIS & E. NELL, RATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC MAN (1975); RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY 2 (B. Barry & R. Har-
din eds. 1982); Russell & Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in Competitive
Markets, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 1071 (1985).
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reflect their preferences.9 It concludes that the economic
analysis of law is founded on overly confining assumptions
about human motivation and on possibly naive expectations
about the link between choice and preference.
Economists customarily respond to the difficulty of de-
fining "self" by adopting one of two approaches.' 0 The first
is based on the theory of egoism and holds that all decisions,
unless mistaken, are by definition self-interested." All
choices, no matter how bizarre, altruistic, or self-destructive,
are designed to maximize personal utility. This behavioral
assumption, with its possibly ideological underpinnings,' 2 is
impossible to disprove.
The second approach is less rigid than egoism, and is
more consistent with the express or implied assumption of
most individuals who apply economic analysis to law.' 3 This
model concedes that people have a broad range of interests.
For the sake of economic analysis, however, it asks us to view
people "as if"1 4 self-interest is narrowly confined to selfish-
ness.15 Because the narrow self-interest assumption is inher-
9. See infra text accompanying notes 212-59.
10. See H. MARGOLIS, supra note 7, at 7; H. LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 8, at 8;
Coleman, Individual Interests and Collective Action, in PAPERS ON NON-MARKET DECI-
SION MAKING 49, 55 (G. Tullock ed. 1966); Seabright, In Excess of Egotism, London
Times, Literary Supplement, Dec. 10, 1982, at 1354, col. 1.
11. See M. LUTZ & K. Lux, supra note 7, at 80-81; T. NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY
OF ALTRUISM 84-87 (1970); Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nomi-
nalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 457-58 (1974); Michelman, Reflection on Professional Edu-
cation, Legal Scholarship, and the Law-and-Economics Movement, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 197,
198-99 (1983); Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 7, at 322-23.
12. Some commentators have alleged that this behavioral assumption is part
of the general assumption of "capitalist rationality." See Kelman, Misunderstanding,
supra note 7; Roemer, Neoclassicism, Marxism, and Collective Action, 12J. ECON. ISSUES
147 (1978); Note, A Comment on Collective Action, Marxism and the Prisoners Dilemma,
13 J. ECON. ISSUES 761 (1979); Note, Mass Action is Not Individually Rational: A
Reply, 13J. ECON. ISSUES 763, 765-67 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Aass Ac-
tion]; Note, A Note on Collective Action, Marxism, and the Prisoner's Dilemma, 13J. ECON.
ISSUES 751 (1979).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 55-79.
14. See generally H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF "As IF" (C.K. Ogden
trans. 2d ed. 1935).
15. For purposes of this Article, "selfish" behavior is behavior that is trig-
gered by a perceived direct personal benefit. Selfish behavior does not include:
(1) adherence to principles as a matter of lexicographical ordering, see infra text
accompanying notes 96-118; (2) giving to or sharing with others, or incorporat-
ing the gains or losses of others into one's own decision-making processes out of a
sense of duty; or (3) behavior listed in (2) resulting in a sense of sacrifice. Selfish-
ness does include the kind of "altruism" in which a person, with no sense of sacri-
fice, attempts to increase his or her own immediate pleasure by enhancing the
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ently ambiguous and frequently inaccurate, we should
regard with caution the conclusions that follow from it.
Whether the correct behavioral assumption is egoism or
narrow self-interest, economic analysis depends on market
behavior as a medium for communicating preferences.16
Although the definition of a "market" in law and economics
is more flexible than the one employed in conventional eco-
nomics, market behavior is relied upon for the same pur-
pose. In either discipline one encounters difficulties when
attempting to ascertain preferences. For example, decision-
makers may conceal their preferences, or may respond to
the way in which a choice is presented or "framed" rather
than to the actual substance of the choice.' 7 The econo-
mists' use of "value" as the measure of the intensity of pref-
erences creates its own special problems.18 In short, the
decision-making process frequently distorts our perception
of preferences. 19
The two assumptions I examine are central to the two
areas of study and controversy sparked by the joining of law
and economics. Most of the recent literature in the field ad-
dresses the morality of "efficient" resource allocation.20
pleasure of others. In those cases, altruism is little more than the use of surrogate
consumers, typically members of one's own household. This sort of altruism is
what Harold Margolis appropriately calls "egoistic altruism." H. MARGOLIS, supra
note 7, at 98, 103; see also D. COLLARD, ALTRUISM AND ECONOMY 18-30 (1978);
Coleman, supra note 10; Margolis, A New Model of Rational Choice, 91 ETHICS 265,
266 n.4; Sen, Behavior and the Concept of Preference, 40 ECONOMICA 241, 256 (1973)[hereinafter cited as Sen, Behavior]; cf E. FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM 133-38(1941); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (2d ed. 1977).
16. See, e.g., Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 243 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Samuelson, Consumption Theory];
Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 61(1938) [hereinafter cited as Samuelson, Pure Theory]; see also Sen, Behavior, supra
note 15.
17. See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL-
OGIST 341 (1984); Kahneman & Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, ScI. AM.,Jan.
1982, at 160; see infra text accompanying notes 222-37.
18. The wealth effect is one of the more frequently discussed problems. See
infra text accompanying notes 238-47; see also C. GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS 53
(1984); A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 124-25 (1983);
Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1975);
Kelman, Consumption Theory, supra note 7; Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitle-
ment Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 212-65; see also Sen, Behavior, supra note
15.
20. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981); Baker, supra note
18; Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the Foundations of the Eco-
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This normative question, though, rests on the existence of a
reliable means of determining preferences. Similarly, the in-
quiry into the design of efficient substantive rules and reme-
dieS2' is misguided if it assumes that people are narrowly
self-interested, when, in fact, they respond to the well-being
of others.
This discussion does not directly question the bases of
economic analysis in its traditional applications. For exam-
ple, the narrow self-interest behavioral assumption may be
consistent with observable impersonal market decisions. Ec-
onomics may explain why a trip to the supermarket results in
the purchase of one quantity of potatoes instead of another,
or why the price of wheat is higher this year than last. But,
when the supermarket shelves present choices labeled "con-
tract breach," "theft," or "rescue," we have no reason to be-
lieve that the same assumption is appropriate. These
decisions are extraordinarily complex. They are heavily in-
fluenced by social norms and notions of right, duty, and fair-
ness. They may also have specifically identifiable external
effects. Thus, the fact that the "price" on contract breach is
marked "expectancy" may be a single, possibly minor, factor
in an intricate decision-making process. Very simply, the
premises of the impersonal market model may not be trans-
ferable to the highly personal and value-laden "markets" of
law and economics. 22 Consequently, predictions and poli-
cies based on these premises may turn out to be non sequiturs.
nomic Approach to Law, 94 ETHiCS 649 (1984); Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980);
Kennedy, supra note 18; Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9J.
LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980); Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm
in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).
21. See, e.g., C. GOETZ, supra note 18; Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penal-
ties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory
of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); Goetz & Scott, Measuring Sellers'
Damages: The Lost Profits Puzzle, 31 STAN L. REV. 323 (1979); Harrison, The "New"
Terminable-at- Will Employment Contract: An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA
L. REV. 327 (1984); Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Con-
tracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978); Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the
Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982); Posner & Rosenfeld, Impossibility and Related Doc-
trines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
An interesting and related question is whether efficient common-law rules
have already evolved. See R. POSNER, supra note 15; Epstein, The Social Consequences
of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1717 (1982); Hovenkamp, The Economics of
Legal History, 67 MINN. L. REV. 645 (1983).
22. But see R. POSNER, supra note 20, at 1-2.
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My primary objective is to question assumptions2 3 in or-
der to show that the conventional economic approach to law
and public policy is of limited value. My arguments are
founded on empirical evidence drawn from many fields of
study. An underlying theme is that the current application
of economic analysis to law should be regarded as an interim
step toward the integration of law with the behavioral, natu-
ral, and social sciences.2 4
In Part I, I describe the two forms of the self-interest
assumption more completely. This examination reveals that
economics and the separate study of law and economics are
caught in a dilemma, unable to embrace completely either
of the two versions of the self-interest assumption. Egoism
is an empty concept, and narrow self-interest asks us to ig-
nore higher order preferences and altruism. In Part II, I
focus on the narrow self-interest assumption and illustrate
why its application to law is inappropriate. In Part III, I ex-
amine the problems of relying on choices, including market
choices, as indicators of preference.
I. THE RATIONAL MAXIMIZER OF SELF-INTEREST
A. Rationality and Self-Interest
It is possible to adopt the view that rationality and self-
23. Questioning assumptions, as a mode of critical analysis, has formidable
detractors. Richard Posner, echoing Milton Friedman, M. FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3-43 (1953), has observed that to "criticize a theory on the
grounds that its assumptions are unrealistic is to commit a fundamental method-
ological error," R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 13; cf R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN
SOCIETY 11-13 (1976). Posner's point is that abstraction is a necessary element of
scientific inquiry. In the Friedman-Posner view, the real test of a theory is how
predicted results conform to reality; independent consideration of assumptions is
of little consequence. M. FRIEDMAN, supra, at 14-15; R. POSNER, Supra note 15, at
13; cf Nagel, Assumptions in Economic Theory, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 211 (1963). This
view of economic methodology, though, is unsatisfactory when it is difficult to test
the theory by comparison to reality. See Simon, Problems of Methodology-Discussion,
53 AM. ECON. REV. 229, 229-31 (1963) (comments of H. Simon).
More importantly, even when empirical verification is possible, one is
tempted to believe that the assumptions underlying the theory are valid because
the predicted results did occur. This, of course, is illogical. If I assume A and
therefore predict B will occur, and then B does occur, I will not have proven that
my initial assumption was valid. The greater danger is that I may begin to con-
struct new theories on the basis of newly "verified" assumptions. Id. at 229 (com-
ments of H. Simon), 232-34 (comments of P. Samuelson).
24. Cf Leff, supra note 11, at 469-77.
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interest are not distinct:2 5 To act rationally means to act in
one's own interest. It is more common, and more produc-
tive, to view rationality as consistency within a system of be-
liefs. 26 Under this view, rationality and self-interest, though
perhaps functionally indistinguishable, are at least concep-
tually distinct. Thus, in theory, it is possible for individuals
to pursue purely altruistic goals in a manner characterized
by consistent action. Rationality, in effect, concerns meth-
odology; self-interest describes the object or substance of
the methodology.
The primary difference in the two versions of the ra-
tional maximizer of self-interest assumption is the relation-
ship between rationality and self-interest. Venn diagrams
conveniently illustrate this difference. 27 In Figure I, A repre-
FIGURE I
Rational Conduct Self-interested Conduct
sents the universe of rational activity. This is all activity that
is consistent with an individual's belief system or systems.
These actions further some goal of the individual. In the
25. See Frohlich & Oppenheimer, supra note 4, at 3; Sen, Rational Fools, supra
note 7, at 342.
26. See, e.g., M. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 102-03 (1984); Arrow, Current
Developments in the Theory of Social Choice, in RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCI-
ET'? 252, 254 (B. Barry & R. Hardin eds. 1982); Frolich & Oppenheimer, supra
note 4, at 3-4; Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, I'alues and Frames, supra note 17, at
343; Tverskv, itransitivity of Preferences, 76 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 31, 31-32 (1969);
Weyrauch, Taboo and Magic iii Law, 25 STAN. L. REV. 782, 800 (1973). The central
concept of rationality is dominance or transitivity. That is, if A is preferred to B,
and B is preferred to C, then .4 is preferred to C.
27. I am indebted to Hugo Bedau for suggesting Venn diagrams as a way to
illustrate these relationships.
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case of multiple goals, A includes several constellations of
rational conduct. Circle B, on the other hand, represents
the universe of all self-interested behavior. Its content is,
therefore, substantive and goal-specific. Precisely what
"self" connotes, as indicated earlier, is an important ques-
tion to which I will return later.2
8
B. Revealed Preferences and Egoism
Figure II illustrates the assumption that all rational be-
FIGURE II
Conduct
havior is self-interested. This assumption leaves open the
possibility that some self-interested behavior lies outside the
limits of rationality. Such actions would be motivated by
self-interest, but, because of error, are inconsistent with it.
Thus, from the standpoint of egoism, rational behavior is a
subset of self-interested behavior. There is but one belief
system-the self. Competing belief systems and actions con-
sistent with those systems will not be recognized, and will
likely be charactereized as irrational.2 In fact, because it is
28. See itifra text accompanying notes 144-95.
29. See Weyrauch, supra note 26, at 800; cf A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY
OF DEMOCRACY 260-76 (1957). For an example of how the question of rationality
is raised with regard to an issue of public policy, see Balch, Abortion: A General
Concern, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1984, at A31, col. 1; Callahan, Restraint Serves Plural-
isn, N.Y. l'imes, Sept. 20, 1984, at A31, col. 5.
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essentially impossible not. to be self-interested, the real as-
sumption here is merely that people have a consistent order-
ing of preferences.3 °
In the modern era of economics, the egoistic3' view of
self-interest and rationality is bound up with what econo-
mists call "revealed preference theory," an area of study pio-
neered by Paul Samuelson nearly fifty years ago.3 2
Samuelson proposed that the difficulties encountered in at-
tempting to determine preferences by considering elusive
measures of psychic well-being can be avoided by simply ob-
serving the market choices individuals make.33 Despite its
attempt to avoid the hazards of mind reading, the theory
cannot escape all the mysteries of choice. As Amartya Sen
has noted, the observer still must "peek into the head of the
consumer" to determine the relationship between prefer-
ence and choice.3 4
This problem aside for now,3 5 the "proof" of egoism is
not the content of one's choice but the fact of choice mak-
ing. 36 If it is my choice, then by definition it is the choice that
is most satisfying or comforting to me. Consequently, I have
acted in my self-interest. Accordingly, all consistent choices
are self-interested. Economists adopting the egoist behav-
ioral assumption have applied economic models to altru-
ism, 37 discrimination3 s fertility,39 love,40 marriage,4i and
myriad human emotions and actions. Even irrationality has
30. For examples of reliance on the egoism assumption, see D. ALHADEFF,
MICROECONOMICS AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1982); G. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC AP-
PROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); R. CROUCH, HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND Eco-
NOMIC APPROACH (1979); De Alessi, supra note 8; Kitch, The Intellectual Foundations
of "Law and Economics," 33J. LEGAL EDUC. 184, 187 (1983). See generally J. WALKER,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF EGOISM (1905).
31. Egoism, of course, has roots far deeper than contemporary economics. It
can be traced to the Epicurean notion of the pleasure principle and is welded to
utilitarianism generally. See D. BAUMGARDT, BENTHAM AND THE ETHICS OF TODAY
416-26 (1966); D. LYONS, IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNED 12, 13 (1973); H.
SEDGWICK, THE ART OF HAPPINESS 14, 15 (1933).
32. See Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 16; Samuelson, Consumption Theory.
supra note 16. See generally M. LUTZ & K. Lux, supra note 7, at 323-36; Sen, Behav-
ior, supra note 15.
33. Samuelson, Consumption Theory, supra note 16, at 243.
34. Sen, Behavior, supra note 15, at 243.
35. For a discussion of the connection between choice and preference, see
infra text accompanying notes 213-37.
36. See Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 7, at 322-23.
37. See, e.g., Becker, Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobi-
ology, 14J. ECON. LIT. 817, 818 (1976). See generally M. LUTZ & K. Lux, supra note
1986] 1317
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not escaped the graphs and equations of economic
analysis. 42
The revealed preference theory, as a means of detecting
consumer preferences, has been the subject of a running de-
bate since it was introduced in 1938.43 It raises two ques-
tions. First, does the revealed preference theory support the
assumption that preferences are inextricably wedded to self-
interest? Second, can we really determine preferences, even
if exclusively egoistic, by examining choices?
We can dispose of the first question rather quickly. As
proof of the view that people are wholly self-interested, the
revealed preference theory is tautological and, thus, no
proof at all. 44 The theory is little more than a statement that
the capacity to choose or to recognize our indifference to
alternatives is proof that we are moved solely by self-inter-
est. Because there is no method for testing this hypothesis,
this view fails to prove that our choices are generally egoistic
or to explain their content. 45
Reliance on the theory of egoism frequently requires
the invocation of "fillers" such as "psychic income ' '46 or
"social invisibles." 47 These are necessary to produce the ap-
7, at 80-83; Hammond, Charity. Altruism or Cooperative Egoism?, in ALTRUISM, MO-
RALITY AND ECONOMIC THEORY 115 (E. Phelps ed. 1975).
38. G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957).
39. See, e.g., R. CROUCH, supra note 30, at 171; Willis, A New Approach to the
Economic Theory of Fertility Behavior, 81 J. POL. ECON. S14 (1973).
40. See, e.g., R. CROUCH, supra note 30, at 153.
41. See, e.g., Becker, A Theory of Marriage, Part !, 81 J. POL. ECON. 813 (1973);
Becker, A Theory of Marriage, Part 11, 82J. POL. ECON. SI 1 (1974).
42. See, e.g., Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1
(1962).
43. For a short, nontechnical history of this debate, including citations, see M.
LUTZ & K. Lux, supra note 7, at 323-26. See generally N. GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, EN-
ERY; AND ECONOMIC MrTHS (1976); Georgescu-Roegen, Choice and Revealed Prefer-
ence, 21 S. ECON. REV. 119 (1954); Georgescu-Roegen, Choice, Expectations and
Mleasurability, 68 Q.J. ECON. 503 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Georgescu-Roegen,
Choice]; Georgescu-Roegen, 7'he Pure Theory of Consumers Behavior, 50 O.J. ECON.
545 (1936); Houthakker, Revealed Preference and the Utility Function, 17 ECONOMICA
(n.s.) 159 (1950); Samuelson, The Problem of Integrability in Utility Theory, 17
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 355 (1950).
44. See M. LUTZ & K. LUX, supra note 7, at 80; Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 7,
at 322-23; Note, Mass Action, supra note 12, at 766.
45. (. M. HOLLIS & E. NELL, supra nole 8, at 53-56; H. LEIBENSTEIN, supra
note 8, at 7-8. See also Michelman, supra note 11.
46. See H. MARGOIIS, supra note 7, at 59.
47. See F. PRYOR, THE ORIGINS OF THE ECONOMY 27-29 (1977); see also Kel-
man, Misunderstanding., supra note 7, at 275.
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pearance of symmetry whenever observed behavior does not
fit a readily understandable self-interest-based explanation.
These fillers eliminate the possibility of altruism by supply-
ing a fictionalized compensation for any seemingly altruistic
transfer that might occur. All transfers are made to appear
reciprocal. If I give a "gift" to someone it is for the "psychic
income" I receive in return. The imbalance of gift giving is
conveniently remedied, and self-interest is maintained as the
sole motivating force.
"Psychic income" and "social invisibles" are invariably
sufficient to balance even the most one-sided transfers, if
one believes that all transfers must be balanced.48 On the
other hand, as economic anthropologist Frederick Pryor
points out, for those less convinced of the inevitability of
balancing, a sufficient amount of "psychic income" always
exists to create an imbalance. 49 "Psychic income"-7a wob-
bling crutch for egoism-explains little of substance about
motivation. 50 Sen captures the "self-sealing"' quality of the
theory: "[If] you are consistent, then no matter whether you
are a single-minded egoist or a raving altruist or a class-con-
scious militant, you will appear to be maximizing your own
utility in this enchanted world of definitions."52
The theory's lack of predictive capacity is only one of its
shortcomings and not the most inimical. Because it does not
recognize the possibility of non-self-interested ,behavior, it is
an inescapable paradigm. 53 It shares this inhibiting quality
with all tautological explanations. And yet, as Walter
Weyrauch observes, the use of tautological -explanations is
best regarded as a signal of how little we have explained
rather than how much. 5 4
48. F. PRYOR, supra note 47, at 39, 95 n.27.
49. Id. at 95 n.27.
50. See M. DOUGLAS & B. ISHERWOOD, THE WORLD OF GOODS 19-20 (1979); H.
LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 8, at 7-8; H. MARGOLIS, supra note 7, at 87; F. PRYOR,
supra note 47, at 28; Leff, supra note 11, at 457.
51. "Self-sealing" seems like a perfect characterization of tautological theo-
ries, for they are absolutely "puncture proof." Walter Weyrauch provided me
with this phrase, but says he first heard it from Professor Leon Lipson.
52. Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 7, at 323.
53. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
enlarged 1970).
54. Wevrauch, On Definitions, Tautologies, and Etlhnocentiism in Regard to Universal
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS 198 (E. Pollack ed. 1971).
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C. The Narrow Self-Interest Assumption
The possibility that rationality is not consumed by self-
interest is illustrated by the Venn diagrams in Figure III.
This version of the self-interested behavior assumption al-
FIGURE III
Rational Conduct Self-interested Conduct
lows for self-interested behavior that may be irrational.
More important, it recognizes the existence of rational be-
havior that is not self-interested. Thus, the narrow self-in-
terest assumption is a method of simplifying the analysis by
asking us to consider only that behavior represented by the
shaded or intersecting portions of universes A and B, labeled
X. The critical issue is how much behavior can be character-
ized as falling within X. Or, conversely, how much rational
behavior-behavior that is consistent with respect to some be-
lief system-is not self-interested?
My impression is that narrow self-interest-not ego-
ism-is the behavioral assumption most commonly em-
ployed by those applying economic analysis to law. For
example, in a recent article, Robert Cooter specified his be-
havioral assumption as denoting "[a] person who is ration-
ally self-interested," 55 and excluded from his model
"[s]omeone who acts from duty and obeys the law out of
respect." 56 Charles Goetz introduces his law and economics
casebook with the following caution: "In some circum-
stances, arguments based on economic reasoning will have
55. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1527 (1984).
56. Id. at 1527 n.9.
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undeniable relevance and potent persuasive force. In other
situations, economic factors may be of rather trivial weight
as compared to amorphous-yet perfectly valid-ethical,
moral or even viscerally instinctive notions of what is right
and just."5 7
Even Richard Posner seems to leave room for the possi-
bility of non-self-interested behavior. He begins his seminal
work, The Economic Analysis of Law, with the typical behavioral
assumption that "man is a rational maximizer of his ends in
life," 58 and adds, in defense of his assumption, that "the as-
sumptions of economic theory are to some extent oversim-
plified and unrealistic as descriptions of human behavior-
especially as applied to such unconventional actors as the
judge, the litigant, the parent, the rapist and others." 59
Later he observes that "clearly, moral principles often con-
flict with individual self-interest. ' ' 60
Neither Cooter, nor Goetz, nor Posner 61 seem to sug-
gest that rational behavior must always be self-interested.
They appear to recognize the existence of belief systems or
interests that compete with self-interest. The proof of this
may be the fact that an assumption of self-interest must be
made at all. 62 They ask us to simplify our analysis, by ignor-
ing a great deal of human motivation, in order to make eco-
nomic analysis more manageable. This is a common
57. C. GOETZ, supra note 18, at 4.
58. R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 3; see also id. at 20.
59. Id. at 12-13.
60. Id. at 186. Judge Posner also seems to recognize the possibility of rational
behavior in the absence of "all expectation of any form of compensation," in
Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic
Study of Law and Altruism, 7J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 93-100 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Landes & Posner, Salvors]; see also Landes & Posner, Altruism in Law and Economics,
68 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS AND PROC. 417 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Landes &
Posner, Altruism].
61. As I have implied, I may be wrong in my assertion that judge Posner does
not subscribe entirely to the egoist point of view. For example, he states specifi-
cally that "self-interest" should not be equated with selfishness. R. POSNER, supra
note 15, at 3. He also makes psychic-income types of arguments. See id. at 132,
188. Finally, his discussions of altruism seem bound up with attempts to maxi-
mize individual utility. See Landes & Posner, Salvors, supra note 60, at 93-100.
Still, his staunch defense of the use of assumptions in scientific inquiry, R. Pos-
NER, supra note 15, at 12-14, 20, indicates that he is acutely aware that these as-
sumptions ask us to ignore some categories of human behavior. In any case, it
seems fair to infer that he does not feel these "residual" areas are very important.
See R. POSNER, supra note 20, at 1-2.
62. An egoist would require only that behavior be consistent.
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approach to scientific inquiry and is difficult to fault. It is
important, though, to examine carefully the model of behav-
ior this assumption asks us to consider: We are asked to as-
sume that people are basically selfish; that is, that individuals
are not guided by moral principles and are not responsive to
the specific needs of others. 63
A better understanding of this self-interest assumption
can be gained by comparing the assumption with the pat-
terns of moral reasoning initially explored by Jean Piaget,
64
and extensively researched more recently by psychologist-
philosopher Lawrence Kohlberg.65 Kohlberg's work verify-
ing his hypothesis that individuals progress through stages
of moral development is especially relevant.66 His basic
model includes three levels of moral development, each of
which is divided into two stages. 67 The three levels are
preconventional, conventional, and postconventional. At
the preconventional level, the individual is responsive to
"good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in
terms of either the physical or hedonistic consequences of
action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms
of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and
labels." 68 Reasoning at this level is highly individualistic. At
the conventional level, "maintaining the expectations of the
individual's family, group or nation is perceived as valuable
in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious conse-
quences." 69 At the postconventional level, "there is a clear
effort to define moral values and principles that have validity
and application apart from the authority of groups or people
63. See supra note 15.
64. See, e.g., J. PIAGET, THE MORALJUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1965); J. PIAGET,
THE ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN (1936).
65. See, e.g., A. COLBY, L. KOHLBERGJ. GIBBS & M. LIEBERMAN, A LONGITUDI-
NAL STUDY OF MORAL JUDGMENT (Monograph of the Society for Research in Child
Development vol. 48, nos. 1-2, 1983) [hereinafter cited as A. COLBY, LONGITUDI-
NAL STUDY]; L. KOHLBERG, THIE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981); L.
KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1984); Kohlberg, Moral
Stages atd Moralization, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 31 (T. Lickona ed.
1976) [hereinafter cited as Kohlberg, Moral Stages]. For an important discussion
of how moral development in women may differ from that posited by Kohlberg,
see C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
66. Kohlberg, Moral Stages, supra note 65.
67. For a more complete description of the levels and stages, see A. COLBY,
LONGITUDINAL STUDY, supra note 65, at 4-5.
68. L. KOHLBERG, [HE PHIIOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 17.
69. Id. at 18.
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holding these principles and apart from the individual's own
identification with these groups." 70
Kohlberg determines whether the reasoning of an indi-
vidual is preconventional, conventional, or postconventional
by examining the individual's responses to hypothetical di-
lemmas. 7' The core of this research is devoted to longitudi-
nal72 studies correlating age with level of moral reasoning.
Probably the clearest and most consistent discovery is that,
by the late teenage years, preconventional or Level I reason-
ing about moral issues is extremely rare.73
The self-interest assumption of law and economics is
virtually identical to Kohlberg's preconventional reasoning.
For example, consider the explanations one might expect
from individuals, at each level of moral development, who
have decided not to breach a contract.
Preconventional explanation: I did not breach the contract be-
cause I would probably lose in court and have to pay dam-
ages. Expected damages would more than offset the benefits
of breaching.
Conventional explanation: I did not breach because to breach
would be to break my promise. I did not want to break my
promise because if everyone broke his promises the world
would be chaotic.
Postconventional explanation: I did not break my promise be-
70. Id.
71. A well-known example is the Heinz Dilemma:
In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a spe-
cial kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought
might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same
town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but
the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make.
He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of
the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he
knew to borrow the money, but he could get together only about
$1,000, which was half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his
wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later.
But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to
make money from it." Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's
store to steal the drug for his wife.
L. KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 12.
72. Longitudinal studies examine the same participants over a period of time.
See A. COLBY, LONGITUDINAL STUDY, supra note 65. Longitudinal studies devoted
to examining the cultural universality of Kohlberg's stages of moral judgment
have been conducted. See L. KOHLBERG, THE PSYCIHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOP-
MENT, supra note 65, at 582-620.
73. See A. COLBY, LONGITUDINAL STUDY, supra note 65, at 46-50.
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cause when someone has my promise it becomes his prop-
erty. And to take someone else's property is to violate his
rights.
Similarly, consider the reasoning of someone who has
decided to install a device on his automobile that will reduce
the likelihood of injuring others.
Preconventional explanation: I installed the device because the
probability that I will be in an accident and be found liable
multiplied by the damage caused by the accident is less than
the cost of the device.
Conventional explanation: I installed the device because I think
doing so is consistent with the respect people in our society
should have for the property of others.
Postconventional explanation: I installed the device because it is
wrong to harm the property of others if the harm can be
avoided.
The preconventional explanations-modified only slightly
from Kohlberg's own examples 74 -are, in fact, examples of
the reasoning employed when economic analysis is applied
to the decisions whether to breach a contract 75 and whether
to take a safety precaution. 76 Apparently, the law and eco-
nomics behavioral assumption is that adults reason in essen-
tially the same manner as children.
This assumption may be appropriate in analyzing im-
personal market transactions. Kohlberg's work on reason-
ing about moral dilemmas strongly suggests, however, that
the assumption is inappropriate in precisely those "markets"
that are the subject of the economic analysis of law. The
importance of this suggestion cannot be overstated and is
visualized in Figure II. The application of economic analysis
to law begins with the assumption that all behavior takes
place within the shaded area of the diagram. Kohlberg's re-
74. See Kohlberg, Moral Stages, supra note 65, at 36-37.
75. See, e.g., A. POLINSKY, supra note 18, at 29-32; R. POSNER, supra note 15, at
16, 88-93; Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures and Economic Efficiency,
24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970); Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Effi-
ciency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1981).
Evidently, this is the view reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
(1981). See Linzer, supra, at 111-12.
76. The preconventional explanation is, of course, the Hand Formula (balanc-
ing the magnitude of the risk and gravity of the harm against the utility of the
conduct). See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947); A. POLINSKY, supra note 18, at 38-40; Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of
Liability, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973).
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sults require us to question whether any of the behavior to
which the economic analysis of law is devoted falls within
this area. 77
In spite of its limits, narrow self-interest is superior to
egoism as a starting point for economic analysis. The reason
for this lies in the approaches to research each permits.
Egoism is a nonfalsifiable theory that discourages inquiry be-
cause it has an airtight and empty answer to all questions of
economic behavior. Narrow self-interest, in contrast, con-
cedes that some behavior cannot be explained by a behav-
ioral model, and requires the theorist to specify the types of
behavior to be excluded. Unfortunately, this specification
process eliminates factors that are especially valuable in ex-
plaining behavior in law and economics "markets." More-
over, in the field of law, despite the warnings of those
employing it,78 the assumption seems to have been accepted
as the end, not the beginning, of the inquiry.
The narrow self-interest model, however, can be incor-
porated into a more accurate portrayal of behavior.7 9 The
following section identifies how the narrow self-interest
model falls short. Directly and by implication it suggests
that socio-legal inquiry should explore more fully the impor-
tance of altruism in either of two forms.
II. THE Two FACES OF ALTRUISM
The economic analysis of law is devoted to the study of
decisions that are made in the lights and shadows of "right"
and "wrong," and with full knowledge that the decisions will
affect others. It is in this context that altruistic behavior is
77. A related and important issue is whether individuals actually behave in a
manner that is consistent with their moral reasoning. Empirical results generally
indicate a positive correlation between action and the level of moral development.
See L. KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 498-58 1; Blasi, Bridg-
ing Moral Cognition and Moral Action: A Critical Review of the Literatures, 88 PSYCHO-
LOGICAL BULL. 1 (1980); Kohlberg & Candee, The Relationship of MoralJudgment to
Moral Action, in MORALITY, MORAL BEHAVIOR AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 52 (W.
Kurtines &J. Gewirtz eds. 1984).
78. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 55-57 (the statements of Robert
Cooter and Charles Goetz).
79. More specifically, it expressly eschews the "self-sealing" quality found in
egoism. The proof of this is in the testing that can and has been conducted. See
materials cited infra note 157.
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most likely to occur.80 Two distinct types of behavior fall
inside the ambit of altruism, and both have the capacity to
strip the gears of conventional economic analysis.8 '
The first type of altruism is defined by philosopher Tom
Nagel and economist Amartya Sen. According to Nagel, al-
truism is characterized as a "direct reason to promote the in-
terest of another-a reason which does not depend on
intermediate factors such as one's own interests or on ante-
cedent sentiments of sympathy and benevolence."8 2 The
primary feature of Nagel's definition is that self-interest is
not relevant to decision making. But it goes further than
that: Altruistic actions not only are not designed to maxi-
mize one's own utility but also are not consciously directed
to a specific beneficiary. Nagel's altruism is rigidly impartial
and is founded on objective, not subjective, values. It is best
exemplified by actions based on a sense of duty or moral
obligation.
Sen distinguishes between "sympathy" and "commit-
ment." 83  In a broad sense, sympathy can be viewed as
grounded in self-interest because a person's "well-being is
psychologically dependent on someone else's welfare." 84
Commitment, on the other hand, involves "choosing an act
80. It is possible to view altruism as but one objective that competes with self-
interest. See Frohlich & Oppenheimer, supra note 4.
81. The two forms I discuss below are similar to those found in D. COLLARD,
surpa note 15, at 12-15; Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY AND
ECONOMIC THEORY, 13, 17-18 (E. Phelps ed. 1975); McKenzie, The Economic
Dimensions of Ethical Behavior, 87 ETHICS 208, 212-16 (1977).
82. T. NAGEL, supra note 11, at 15-17 (emphasis in original). Nagel states that
altruism does exist, and makes his position especially plausible by supplying the
following account of a world in which others do not count:
[I]t would have to show itself not only in the lack of a direct concern
for others but also in an inability to regard one's own concerns as
being of interest to anyone else, except instrumentally or contin-
gently upon the operation of some sentiment. An egoist who needs
help, before concluding that anyone else has reason to assist him,
must be able to answer the question "What's it to him?" He is pre-
cluded from feeling resentment, which embodies the judgment that
another is failing to act on reasons with which one's own needs pro-
vide him. No matter how extreme his own concern the egoist will
not feel that this in itself need be of interest to anyone else. The
pain which gives him a reason to remove his gouty toes from under
another person's heel does not in itself give the other any reason to
remove the heel, since it is not his pain.
Id. at 84-85; see alsoJ. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 188-89 (1971).
83. Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 7, at 326-29.
84. Id. at 327.
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that (one) believes will yield a lower level of personal welfare
... than an alternative that is available. ' '8 5 For example, "if
the knowledge of torture of others makes you sick, it is a
case of sympathy; if it does not make you feel personally
worse off, but you think it is wrong and you are ready to do
something to stop it, it is a case of commitment.- 86 Sen's
notion of commitment is non-self-interested because it can
involve "counterpreferential choice."8 7 This is a distressing
proposition for economic analysis because, as Sen so suc-
cinctly states, commitment "drives a wedge between per-
sonal choice and personal welfare." 88
Sen's "commitment" is distinguishable from Nagel's
"altruism" because it does not require impartiality.89 Thus,
the decision-maker may favor some groups over others and,
supposedly, even some individuals over others. 90 The criti-
cal elements are that preferences are ordered and that these
orderings of preferences are also ranked.9' Commitment
derives from the ability to rank some orderings at a different
level from orderings that are strictly egoistic or based on
sympathy. Like Nagel's altruism, these rankings do not re-
flect the personal preferences of the decision-maker.92
The second type of altruism is not impartial and does
not require the ranking of others' interests above one's own.
According to this view, individuals act to affect the welfare of
specifically identifiable others to whose needs they are re-
sponsive. 93 The object of the altruism may be a family or
85. Id.
86. Id. at 326.
87. Id. at 328.
88. Id. at 329.
89. Id. at 336-37.
90. Id.; cf. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Com-
parison of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955), discussed in Sen, Rational Fools, supra
note 7, at 336-37.
91. Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 7, at 337-41; see also Sen, Choice, Orderings
and Morality, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 74 (A. Sen ed. 1982) [herein-
after cited as Sen, Choice].
92. Nagel's altruism and Sen's notion of commitment provide us with ways of
confronting the egoistic self-interest assumption. Whether this can be success-
fully done, of course, depends on how far one is willing to take the "psychic in-
come" game. For present purposes, their definitions need not bear such a heavy
burden. They are used here to support the view that, even if all choices are ulti-
mately self-serving, there are categories or levels of preferences which cannot be
merged.
93. See infra notes 144-60 and accompanying text.
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group. The individual may or may not be a member of the
group he or she seeks to benefit. The reason for weighing
the impact of others may be a sense of duty or obligation. In
this form of altruism, however, the decision-maker's inter-
ests are balanced against those of others. Others' needs are
not afforded priority. Gift giving and contributing to charity
are standard examples. The decision to vote, as I will ex-
plain below, may also be an example of this weaker form of
altruism. 94
A. The Possibility of Preference Priorities
1. Lexical Ordering
Suppose I have a friend who is a prostitute. I do not
approve of his activity and I am deeply saddened by what I
believe he should find a degrading lifestyle. My feelings are
so strong that I devote a great deal of heartfelt effort to per-
suade him to choose an alternative profession. Assume that
I also believe strongly in freedom of choice. Now suppose I
am faced with the prospect of voting for a law that would
legalize prostitution, and my friend has assured me he will
stop being a prostitute if the ballot issue fails. Assume that I
will not otherwise be affected by the outcome of the voting,
no matter how the issue is resolved. Obviously I have con-
flicting feelings. But my desire that my friend give up prosti-
tution will not influence my vote if I give priority to my
belief that others should have the absolute right to deter-
mine their own actions. Thus, I may vote for the ballot issue
because I believe that all people should be free to make their
own decisions, regardless of how personally upsetting I may
find my friend's decision.95
This example illustrates the possibility that some val-
ues-those afforded priority-simply are not interchangea-
ble with others. When this is the case, these values are said
to be subject to lexicographical ordering. 96 To understand
94. See infra text accompanying notes 161-70.
95. The "personal" versus "political" views that people adopt regarding
abortion provide a current example of this conflict. See Krauthammer, The Church
State Debate, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 17 & 24, 1984, at 15; Balch, supra note 29; Cal-
lahan, supra note 29. See generally J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 9, 95-106 (1956 ed.).
96. See generally J. ELSTER, supra note 7, at 124-33; M. HOLLIS & E. NELL, supra
note 8, at 203; M. LUTZ & K. Lux, supra note 7, at 68-75, 317-26; I. PEARCE, A
CONTRIBUTION TO DEMAND ANALYSIS 22-27 (1964); J. RAWLS, supra note 82, at
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why lexical ordering 97 presents problems for economic anal-
ysis, 98 consider the standard economic perspective. Sup-
pose I have a bundle of six oranges, six pears, and two
copies of Rawls' A Theory of Justice (TJ). I derive from these
possessions a certain level of utility, well-being, content-
ment, or satisfaction. If the government takes one copy of
TJ in order to distribute copies of the book more equitably,
my level of utility will decline. But, under the traditional
analysis, if the government compensates me with enough or-
anges or pears, I will eventually return to my original level of
utility. In short, a number of combinations of copies of TJ,
oranges, and pears will leave me feeling equally well-off. If,
however, a lexical ordering is employed, no combination of
oranges and pears with only one copy of TJ will leave me
feeling as well-off as I would feel with two copies of the
book.99 There is no substitutability between my first level
concern-copies of TJ-and those that satisfy other classes
of needs.10 0
The possibility of lexical ordering has led to important
criticisms of economic theory and applied economics. Con-
ventional economic theory assumes that needs or wants are
reducible. Essentially, there is some common denomina-
tor-utility-that can be used to compare all wants or needs.
If all wants and needs are reduced to a single component,
42-43 (1971); K. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, SCIENCE POLICY, ETHICS, AND ECONOMIC
METHODOLOGY 268-78 (1985); Chipman, The Foundations of Utility, 28
ECONOMETRICA 193 (1960); Fried, Difficulties in the Economic Analysis of Rights, in
MARKETS AND MORALS 175, 181-82 (G. Dworkin, G. Bermant & P. Brown eds.
1977); Georgescu-Roegen, Choice, supra note 43, at 510-18; Houthakker, The Pres-
ent State of Consumption Theory, 29 ECONOMETRICA 704, 710-12 (1961); Pattanaik,
Group Choice with Lexicographic Individual Orderings, 18 BEHAVIORAL SCI. 118 (1973);
Tversky, supra note 26, at 32; Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 66, 90-97 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tribe, Policy Science]; Tribe, Ways
Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J.
1315, 1321 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tribe, Plastic Trees].
97. I will follow the suggestion of J. Rawls that "lexicographical" be short-
ened to "lexical." See J. RAWLS, supra note 82, at 42-43.
98. See M. LUTZ & K. Lux, supra note 7, at 62-73; Georgescu-Roegen, Choice,
supra note 43, at 510-18; Goldman, Business Ethics: Profits, Utilities and Moral Rights,
9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 260, 275-77 (1980); Tribe, Policy Science, supra note 96, at
89-98; Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instru-
mental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 625-33 (1973).
99. The analogy that is commonly made is that one's preferences are ordered
like the words in a dictionary. SeeJ. RAWLS, supra note 82, at 42 n.23; Tribe, Policy
Science, supra note 96, at 90-91.
100. Georgescu-Roegen, Choice, supra note 43, at 513-16.
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one can easily assume infinite interchangeability. The prob-
lem that critics bring to light is that many needs take on a
lexical character and, therefore, are arranged in hierar-
chies. 1 1 Thus, someone with a substandard living cannot
satisfy the need for water and food with tickets to the
ballet. 102
From the standpoint of applied economics, the possibil-
ity of lexical ordering raises doubts about the appropriate-
ness of cost-benefit analysis in the making of public policy.
Lawrence Tribe's eloquent and path-blazing critique of envi-
ronmental policy illustrates the inadequacy of a unidimen-
sional weighing of costs and benefits. 0 3 For example, when
it comes to environmental issues-like the preservation of a
species-the battle is often viewed as taking place between
those willing and those unwilling to afford the existence of a
species lexical priority.1 0 4
This is not meant to imply that lexical ordering is lim-
ited to moral issues. For example, in his important 1954 ar-
ticle, economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen argued against
the tendency to reduce all human wants to a "common ba-
sis.'"105 In 1979, Mark Lutz and Kenneth Lux'0 6 extended
the work of Georgescu-Roegen and specifically noted the
lexical quality of Abraham H. Maslow's hierarchy of
needs.1 0 7 Similarly, Amartya Sen's concept of "commit-
ment" permits the lexical prioritization of groups and social
classes.' 0 8 All of these possibilities are extremely significant
for the use of economic analysis generally. But when eco-
101. Id. But see Griffin, Are There Incommensurable Values?, 7 PHIL. & PuB. AFr. 39
(1977).
102. M. Lutz and K. Lux have merged the problem of lexical ordering, as de-
scribed primarily by Georgescu-Roegen, with Abraham Maslow's "hierarchy of
needs." See M. LUTZ & K. Lux, supra note 7.
103. See Tribe, Plastic Trees, supra note 96; see also Sagoff, le Have let the Enemy
and He is Us or Conflict and Contradiction in Environmental Law, 12 ENvrL. L. 283
(1982).
104. See, e.g., Tribe, Plastic Trees, supra note 96, at 1317-22; Tribe, Policy Science,
supra note 96, at 95; see also Belsky, Environmental Policy Law in the 1980's: Shifting
Back the Burden of Proof 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 18-20, 52-56 (1984).
105. Georgescu-Roegen, Choice, supra note 43, at 515. In this article, Ge-
orgescu-Roegen documents his view that a recognition of the irreducibility of
wants has been a continuing subcurrent in economic thought. Id. at 513-18.
106. M. LUTZ & K. Lux, supra note 7.
107. See A. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1954), discussed in M. LUTZ
& K. Lux, supra note 7, at 9-22.
108. See Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 7, at 336-37.
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nomics is paired with law, lexical, orderings founded on
moral values are of particular consequence.
2. Law and Economics and Lexical Ordering
The narrow self-interest model asks us to assume that
lexical priorities do not exist-that all things can be reduced
to the concept of utility or its law and economics surrogate,
"value."' 0 9 Yet things that are likely to be subject to lexical
ordering, such as rights and duties, are precisely the things
about which the economic analysis of law is most concerned.
For example, if I consider whether or not to break a prom-
ise, I am seen through the filter of economic analysis as be-
ing equally comfortable with keeping my word or breaking
my promise and receiving a certain increase in my assets.
Presumably, I will break the promise for any amount over
that increase. Similarly, I can install a safety device on my
automobile and reduce the risk of injuring another, or I can
save the money and incur the risk that could be avoided. Ac-
cording to standard economic analysis, the device could be
priced at a cost that will leave me indifferent between these
options. If the device costs more than that amount, I will
maximize my utility by not installing the device. Under the
conventional model, these decisions involve a single-plane
weighing of what are comparable values. 0
Let us suppose that instead of the unidimensional cost-
benefit approach of law and economics, I have two rules that
I always observe in my dealings with others. First, I do not
break promises."'I Second, I do not endanger the life of an-
other when I can avoid doing so. These principles are, in
effect, lexically prior to most other things from which I de-
rive satisfaction. They are not reducible to the same class of
utility that I might derive from the goods and services
purchased with the money I receive from breaking my prom-
ise or the money saved by not installing the safety device. As
a consequence, the conventional efficiency-based incentives
of law and economics fail to be incentives at all and the pre-
dictive capacity of the traditional model is undercut.
109. Cf Sagoff, supra note 103, at 289; Tribe, Policy Science, supra note 96, at
94-97.
110. Cf Georgescu-Roegen, Choice, supra note 43, at 515; Tribe, Policy Science,
supra note 96, at 94-97.
111. See generally C. FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE (1981).
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The lexical ordering possibility also has implications for
the Coase Theorem, the backbone of law and economics.' 12
The Theorem states that, in a world without transaction
costs, rights will end up in the possession of those valuing
them most, even if the rights are not initially assigned to
those individuals. 1 For exchanges to take place, each party
must attribute greater utility to what is gained than to what
is given up. Of course, even exchanges that would leave
both parties better-off may not occur, or may be delayed, if
the parties adopt various bargaining strategies in an attempt
to garner a greater share of the surplus created by the
exchange.' 14
Another barrier to exchange stems from lexical order-
ing. For example, assume a situation in which an exchange
would increase the utility of each party. I may see a hat for
which I would pay up to fifteen dollars. In other words, I
would derive more utility from the hat than from anything
else available for fifteen dollars. Based on utility considera-
tions, the seller would accept any amount above five dollars.
An exchange would create a surplus, which would be allo-
cated by the negotiated price. Any price between fifteen
dollars and five dollars would result in a gain in utility for
both of us.
But now that we have discovered the opportunity to di-
vide the surplus, we must also agree on what constitutes an
equitable division.' 1 5 We bring to this problem our own
112. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
113. Id. at 2-15.
114. See generally Coleman, supra note 20; Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 14-27 (1982); Cooter, Marks & Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, I IJ. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).
115. The importance of equity seeking in exchange relationships has been con-
firmed by an area of study called "equity theory." See G. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAV-
IOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS (1974); Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1965); Ad-
ams, Toward an Understanding of Inequity, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 422
(1963); Adams & Rosenbaum, The Relationship of Worker Productivity to Cognitive Dis-
sonance About Wage Inequities, 46J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 161 (1962); Cook & Parcel,
Equity Theory: Directions for Future Research, 47 Soc. INQUIRY 75 (1977); Lane &
Messe, Equity and the Distribution of Rewards, 20J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY
1 (1971); Lawler, Equity Theory as a Predictor of Productivity and Work Quality, 70 PsY-
CHOLOGICAL BULL. 596 (1968); Lawler, Koplin, Young & Fadem, Inequity Reduction
Over Time in an Induced Overpayment Situation, 3 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND
HUMAN PERFORMANCE 253 (1968); Walster, Berscheid & Walster, Neu Directions in
Equity Research, 25J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 151 (1973); Walster & Wal-
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subjective notions of equity. Even if we do not use any bar-
gaining strategy and cooperate fully in our attempts to find a
division that is fair, we may not succeed in agreeing on what
constitutes a fair division. The exchange may still occur, but
it may leave one or both of us feeling cheated.
On the other hand, if we both afford lexical priority to
feeling that we have been treated fairly in the exchange, a
transfer may not occur.1 16 In this situation, increased utility
is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for exchange. If
the "fair treatment" condition is not satisfied, the resources
will not find their way to those who place the highest value
on them in the traditional sense." t 7
The behavior of many people may fall between the strict
lexical prioritization discussed here and the one-dimensional
utility model of law and economics. For example, I might
have an opportunity to breach a contract and, after paying
damages, end up with an increase in wealth of $100. I could
decline this opportunity, yet accept another that involves
breaching the contract in order to increase my wealth by
$500. While it would be inappropriate to say that I have
consistently applied a strict lexical ordering, this does not
revive the traditional law and economics model. Lexical or-
ster, Equity and Social Justice, J. Soc. ISSUES, Summer 1975, at 21. I am indebted to
Matthew Spitzer for introducing me to equity theory. See also E. FROMM, THE ART
OF LOVING 129-33 (1956); Austin, Walster & Utne, Equity and the Law: The Effect of
a Harmdoer's "Suffering in the Act" on Liking and Assigned Punishment, in ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 163 (L. Berkowitz & E. Walster eds. 1976); cf.
Goffman, On Cooling the Mark Out, 15 PSYCHIATRY 451 (1952).
116. Cf Adams, hIequity in Social Exchanges, supra note 115, at 292; Adams, To-
ward an Understanding of Inequity, supra note 115, at 428.
117. I do not mean to imply that "value" and "utility" are the same. The dif-
ference, however, does not affect this analysis.
Recently, Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer presented evidence sug-
gesting that disagreements about what is an equitable division of the gains from
trade are not likely to preclude an exchange. See Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase
Theorem: Some Empirical Tests, 25 J.L. ECON. 73 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Hoff-
man & Spitzer, Coase]; Hoffman & Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights and Fairness: An Ex-
perimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of DistributiveJustice, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 259
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Hoffman & Spitzer, Entitlement]. Although the Hoff-
man-Spitzer studies strongly support the position that individuals are not wholly
self-interested, see infra text accompanying notes 192-98, they are not as persua-
sive regarding whether negotiation can overcome disagreements about the equita-
ble distribution of the surplus the exchange created. This is because the
experimental subjects were given the same information about how power was al-
located between the parties and their relative inputs. If the parties had been given
different information on these points, it seems less likely that they would have
agreed so readily on what constituted an equitable division.
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dering produces an absolute incomparability. The more
limited possibility is that certain values are weighted more
heavily than others. This results in a partial incomparability
or a discontinuity in the exchange function between contract
breaching and monetary reward. Throughout this disconti-
nuity-a range of rewards for breaching-the decision
maker behaves in exactly the same fashion as the person
with an absolute lexical priority, and the implications for the
economic analysis of law are the same." 18
3. Motivation and Moral Values
Is there any basis for expecting some values to be
ranked above individual personal utility? There are power-
ful arguments that this is the case. The explanation for why
rational men would afford lexical priority to the rights of
others stems from Kant's Categorical Imperative:"19 Gener-
ally stated, if men are of equal moral worth, and rational
men do not make distinctions among equals, then it is irra-
tional to favor oneself over another.120 Tom Nagel takes this
Kantian idea and expands it into a full-blown argument in
favor of expecting rational people to behave altruistically. '2 '
His argument is easier to understand if one first examines
why he believes prudence-motivation "by the possibility of
avertable future harm or accessible future benefits"1 22 -is
rational. Typically, prudence is connected to some present
desire, like the desire for security or peace of mind. 23 Nagel
rejects the present-desire explanation and posits that it is ra-
tional to be prudent without regard to present desires. The
heart of his argument is that the rational person can view the
present as simply one period among all possible time peri-
ods, and thus develop a "temporal neutrality."'' 24 According
to Nagel, "prudential reasons arise ... because if it is tense-
118. See Tribe, Policy Science, supra note 96, at 91-93.
119. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (L. Beck trans.
1959).
120. J. MURPHY, KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 75 (1970); see also Goldman,
Rights, Utilities and Contracts, 3 CANADIANJ. PHIL. 121 (Supp. 1977); Sagoff, At the
Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or Why Political Questions are Not All Economic, 23 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1283 (1981).
121. T. NAGEL, supra note 11.
122. Id. at 37.
123. Id. at 27-28.
124. Id. at 61-74.
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lessly true that a reason-predicate applies independently to a
certain event-present or future-then there is a prima fa-
cie reason to promote that event."'' 25
Nagel extends his approach to prudence to explain why
it is rational to be altruistic. As with the capacity to view the
present as one time period among the panorama of time pe-
riods, it is possible to view oneself not simply in terms of
"'I' but as someone-an impersonally specifiable individ-
ual.' 2 6 The consequence of this view is that personal
desires are no more compelling reasons to act than are the
desires of others. People begin to act, not in their own self-
interest, but on the basis of objective reasons alone.
Additional arguments for expecting rational people to
act in accordance with principles are found in Rawls' Theory
of Justice. 127 Rawls initially uses the device of the rationally
self-interested individual in the "original position" in order
to derive the two "Principles ofJustice."128 When Rawls ad-
dresses why the Principles would be observed even though
they may not coincide with the interests of the individual ac-
tor at any particular time, the self-interest model is not rele-
vant.' 29 Rawls depends instead on a progression of three
psychological "laws" that account for the development of a
"sense of justice":
First law: given that family institutions are just, and
that the parents love the child and manifestly express
their love by caring for his good, then the child, recogniz-
ing their evident love of him, comes to love them.
Second law: given that a person's capacity for fellow
feeling has been realized by acquiring attachments in ac-
cordance with the first law, and given that a social ar-
rangement is just and publicly known by all to be just,
then this person develops ties of friendly feeling and
trust toward others in the association as they with evident
intention comply with their duties and obligations, and
live up to the ideals of their station.
Third law: given that a person's capacity for fellow
feeling has been realized by his forming attachments in
accordance with the first two laws, and given that a soci-
125. Id. at 49.
126. Id. at 19.
127. J. RAWLS, supra note 82. See generally Bates, The Motivation to be Just, 85
ETHICS 1 (1974).
128. J. RAWLS, supra note 82, at 118-22.
129. See Bates, supra note 127.
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ety's institutions are just and are publicly known by all to
be just, then this person acquires the corresponding
sense of justice as he recognizes that he and those for
whom he cares are the beneficiaries of these
arrangements. 130
The Rawlsian moral development begins with the self-inter-
est of the child in the first law. The progression culminates
when "moral attitudes are no longer connected solely with
the well-being and approval of particular individuals and
groups, but are shaped by a conception of right chosen irre-
spective of those contingencies."1 3 '
For those requiring more direct evidence than that pro-
vided by logic and theory, the reasoning of Kant, Nagel, and
Rawls may not lead to the conclusion that the limitations of
the behavioral assumption of law and economics undermine
the utility of that analysis. A wealth of casual observations
and some relatively new empirical evidence do, however,
confirm that people behave as though they afford some prin-
ciples lexical priority, or that they at least have major discon-
tinuities in their willingness to view wealth as a substitute for
adherence to principles. For example, the discomfort many
feel about the possibility that access to extraordinary medi-
cal procedures will be determined by market transactions
suggests lexical ordering. Similarly, the rejection of cost-
benefit standards in favor of feasibility standards for the ex-
posure of workers to toxic chemicals seems founded in the
lexical priority afforded human life.' 32 The same sense of
priority surely accounts for the public outcry following the
disclosure that Ford's decision to install "exploding" gas
tanks in its automobiles in the 1970's was a product of cost-
benefit analysis.' 3 3 Finally, decisions that certain things can-
not be bought and sold-the right to vote, the right not to
130. J. RAWLS, supra note 82, at 490-91.
131. Id. at 475.
132. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981); see
also Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and Environ-
mental Regulator, Decision-Making, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473 (1980); Sagoff, supra note
120; Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1267
(1981). See generally Shaw & Wolfe, A Legal and Ethical Critique of Using Cost-Benefit
Analysis in Public Law, 19 Hous. L. RE.v. 899 (1982).
133. See W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
SAFETY 422, 490-91 (1980), and materials cited therein; see also Goldman, supra
note 98, at 276.
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be subject to indentured service'34-indicate lexical order-
ing by society generally.1 3 5
Lawrence Kohlberg offers empirical evidence that peo-
ple, in the realm of moral dilemma, do not reason as though
all values can be reduced to the same concept of utility. Ear-
lier I noted that Kohlberg has found very little preconven-
tional reasoning among adults.' 3 6 The issue of lexical
ordering requires closer consideration of the postconven-
tional level of moral growth. 37 The first of the two stages
that make up the postconventional level (stage five in the
complete scheme) is characterized by the view that "right ac-
tion tends to be defined in terms of individual rights and in
terms of standards that have been critically examined and
agreed upon by the whole society."'' 38 At the second stage
of this level (stage six), "right action is defined by the deci-
sion of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical princi-
ples appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality
and consistency."'' 3 9
Stage six is obviously most in keeping with the Kantian-
based arguments described above.' 40 Kohlberg's experi-
ments have uncovered only isolated instances of reasoning
at this level.' 4' Stage five, however, plays an important role
in the reasoning of many adults. 42 That stage, while ex-
pressing a less-focused notion of universal values, has a clear
lexical quality in that it includes reasoning based on the con-
cept of basic values and the importance of rights and duties.
134. See, e.g., A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 15-22
(1975); see also Sagoff, supra note 103, at 306-08.
135. An argument can be made that constitutional issues are also analyzed
from the standpoint of different priorities. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1482 (1975); see also Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Effi-
ciency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 64-77.
137. See supra text accompanying note 70.
138. L. KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 65, at
18.
139. Id. at 19.
140. Id. at 157-68.
141. See L. KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note
65, at 270-74.
142. See A. COLBY, LONGITUDINAL STUDY, supra note 65. Approximately one-
eighth to one-sixth of Kohlberg's subjects were classified as postconventional. Id.
at 47. But see Liebert, What Develops in Moral Development?, in MORALITY, MORAL
BEHAVIOR AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 177 (W. Kurtines &J. Gewirtz eds. 1984).
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These higher concerns are not readily traded for narrow,
self-serving substitutes. If comparisons and weighing do
take place, the balance is struck between laws, moral princi-
ples, duties, and contractual obligations; 43 the common de-
nominator is not personal preference.
B. Expanded Interests: From Kin to Class Selection
The second form of altruism is grounded in a desire to
benefit identifiable others. It is distinguishable from the first
form of altruism in that it does not afford lexical priority to
the interests of others. For example, although the costs and
benefits to others resulting from my actions may play a role
in my decision making, they are tradeable with my own more
narrowly defined costs and benefits. There may still be a
moral foundation for this form of altruism; the motivation
for considering others may be based on what I think is right.
This sense of duty or rightness, though, does not necessarily
require that the interests of others supercede my own. In
short, I act as though I have internalized the costs and bene-
fits of others-individuals, groups, animals, or plants-at the
same hierarchical level as my own. 144
This form of altruism is not merely an indirect way of
achieving my own personal goals. The emphasis is on the
pursuit of group or collective goals, not as a means of satis-
fying a person's narrowly defined self-interest, but as an end
in itself. For example, neither the person who contributes to
a public broadcasting station because he believes the broad-
casting will stop without the contribution, 45 nor the person
who contributes to a blood bank in order to someday receive
blood in return, 14 6 is altruistic in the sense that is meant
here. In particular, the notion of "reciprocal altruism" is re-
143. See A. COLBY, LONGITUDINAL STUDY, supra note 65, at 4; L. KOHLBERG, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 65, at 18, 152-57; Kohlberg,
Moral Stages, supra note 65, at 33-41. For a consideration of whether reasoning
and behavior are consistent, see supra note 77.
144. I want to distinguish the cases in which complete psychological internal-
ization of costs and benefits occurs. In those instances, your pleasure or pain is
really my pleasure or pain, and my response is hardly altruistic. See Sen, Rational
Fools, supra note 7, at 327 (discussion of "sympathy"). I will, however, use the
term "internalize," or some form of it, to refer to the consideration of the costs
and benefits of others in an altruistic sense. See also supra note 17.
145. This example is suggested by H. MARGOLIS, supra note 7, at 12.
146. This example was inspired by R. TITMUSs, THE Gipn' REATIONSIIIP
(1971).
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ally no more than a form of exhange without currency and,
therefore, is contained within the conventional self-interest
model.147
Determining the strength and breadth of altruistic moti-
vations is beyond economists' present ability. 148 Most of the
notable research into the existence and scope of altruism has
been conducted in the fields of biology, 149 social psychol-
ogy, 150 anthropology,15 1 and coevolutionary analysis, an
area which combines both genetic and environmental factors
as determinants of altruistic behavior.152 Theories range
from "selfish gene" theories, which explain altruistic behav-
ior as directly related to genetic closeness,153 to sociological
theories, which posit a culturally determined group or class
motivational base. 154 These discussions seem to deal more
with the breadth (kin, group, class) and the determinants of
147. See G. HARDIN, THE LIMITS OF ALTRUISM: AN ECOLOGIST'S VIEW OF SUR-
VIVAL 12-15 (1977).
148. But see materials cited infra note 157.
149. See, e.g., C. DARWIN, ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859); R. DAWKINS, supra note 5;
E. WILSON, supra note 5; V. WYNNE-EDWARDS, ANIMAL DISPERSION (1962); Trivers,
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35 (1971); see also R. AR-
DREY, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1970); G. HARDIN, THE LIMITS OF ALTRUISM (1977).
150. See, e.g., Berkowitz & Daniels, Affecting the Salience of the Social Responsibility
Norm: Effect of Past Help on the Response to Dependent Relationships, 68 J. ABNORMAL
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 275 (1964); Berkowitz & Daniels, Responsibility and Dependency,
66J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 429 (1963); Bryan, Why Children Help: A Re-
view, 28J. SOC. ISSUES 87 (1972); Hoffman, Empathy, Role Taking, Guilt, and Develop-
ment of Altruistic Motives, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 124 (T. Lickona
ed. 1976); Kelly, Condry, Dahlke & Hill, Collective Behavior in a Simulated Panic Situ-
ation, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 20 (1965); Kohlberg, Development of
Moral Character and Moral Ideology, in REVIEW OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH
383 (M. Hoffman ed. 1964); Saltzstein, Social Influence and Moral Development, in
MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR, supra, at 253; Schwartz, The Justice of Need and
the Activation of Humanitarian Norms, 31 J. Soc. ISSUES 111 (1975); Walster &
Piliavin, Equity and the Innocent Bystander, 28 J. SOC. ISSUES 165 (1972); Yarrow,
Learning Concern for Others, 8 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 240 (1973); see also E.
DURKHEIM, supra note 6; L. TIGER, MEN IN GROUPS (1970).
151. See, e.g., L. HYDE, THE GIFT (1979); F. PRYOR, supra note 47; M. SAHLINS,
STONE AGE ECONOMICS (1972).
152. For an excellent collection of readings, see EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AND
HUMAN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (N. Chagon & W. Irons eds. 1979).
153. See, e.g., R. DAWKINS, supra note 5; cf M. HARRIS, CULTURAL MATERIALISM
119-40 (1980).
154. See, e.g., E. DURKHEIM, supra note 6; Booth, Collective Action, Marxs Class
Theory, and the Union Movement, 12 J. ECON. ISSUES 163 (1978); Campbell, On the
Genetics of Altruism and the Counter-Hedonic Components in Human Culture, 28 J. Soc.
ISSUES 21 (1972); Cohen, Altruism: Human, Cultural, or Ihat?, 28J. Soc. ISSUES 39
(1972); see also P. KROPOTKIN, MUTUAL AID 223-29 (1904 ed.).
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altruism (genetic or environmental) than with altruism's ac-
tual existence.
An increasing amount of economic literature incorpo-
rates altruism's existence, although usually not its determi-
nants or intensity, into economic models.' 55 Some of the
most intriguing work points out the importance of altruism
in the functioning of traditional markets. 56 This emphasis
on altruism is necessitated by the vast amount of behavior
that cannot be readily explained by the narrow self-interest
model. Common behavior, ranging from a parent's sacrifice
for a child to strikes and social movements, appears irra-
tional if examined only from the perspective of the tradi-
tional self-interest assumption. The narrow self-interest
assumption is further undercut by an increasing wealth of
experimental evidence. 157 As a general matter, these day-to-
day occurrences and experimental results show that "free-
rider"'' 5 8 problems are not as pervasive as the narrow self-
interest view would suggest. 159 Two frequently discussed
examples of behavior that are especially difficult to fit within
conventional economic models are examined here: voting
and actions evincing group solidarity.1 60
155. See, e.g., D. COLLARD, supra note 15; ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC
THEORY (E. Phelps ed. 1975); Frolich, Self-interest or Altruism: What Difference, 18J.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 55 (1974); Kennett, Altruism and Economic Behavior. II, 39
AM.J. ECON. & Soc. 337 (1980); Kolm, Altruism and Efficiency, 94 ETHICS 18 (1983);
Valavanis, The Resolution of Conflict When Utilities Interact, 2 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION
156 (1958). See generally Landes & Posner, Altruism, supra note 60.
156. See Arrow, supra note 81; Kohm, supra note 155.
157. See, e.g., Frolich & Oppenhiemer, supra note 4; Hoffman & Spitzer, Coase,
supra note 117; Hoffman & Spitzer, Entitlements, supra note 117; Marwell & Ames,
Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods: Provision Points, Stakes, Experience and the
Free-Rider Problem, 85 AM. J. Soc. 926 (1980); Marwell & Ames, Experiments on the
Provision of Public Goods: Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-rider Problem, 84
AM. J. Soc. 1335 (1979); Morgan & Sawyer, Bargaining, Expectations and the Prefer-
encefor Equality over Equity, 6 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 139 (1967); see
also Krebs, Altruism: An Examination of the Concept and a Review of the Literature, 73
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 258 (1970); Wispe, Positive Forms of Social Behavior: An Over-
view, 28J. SOC. ISSUES 1 (1972).
158. "Free-rider" problems occur when individuals attempt to enjoy the bene-
fits resulting from purchases by others without making their own contribution. See
infra note 221.
159. See the studies by Marwell and Ames cited supra note 157.
160. These two models need not be regarded as mutually exclusive. They are
separated here for the convenience of discussion.
LIMITS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
1. Voting, the Market, and Law and Economics
The belief that voting is irrational follows from analo-
gizing the act of voting to the purchase of a good or service.
In most instances, the marginal cost of casting one's vote
exceeds the marginal benefit.16' This is not to say the bene-
fits of a particular outcome may not be enormous for a spe-
cific individual. The marginal individual benefit of one's
vote, though, is the overall difference of one outcome over
another multiplied by the probability that the individual's
vote will determine the outcome. For example, even if the
outcome of the presidential election will affect my personal
fortune by $1,000,000, the probability that my vote will de-
termine the outcome is so small that my expected benefit
from voting will approach zero. 62 In any case, my expected
benefit is certainly less than the value of the gasoline, park-
ing expenses, and time actually consumed in voting. In
short, using the conventional analysis, one must conclude
that it is irrational to vote.
Since the groundbreaking work of Anthony Downs 163 il-
lustrating that traditional economic models are simply inad-
equate to explain why people vote, social scientists have
sought ways to explain voting behavior. Some attempts
broaden the traditional analysis to include psychic income
types of factors and preserve the theme of cost-benefit analy-
sis. 164 Others suggest that a sense of duty transcends the
usual cost-benefit analysis.' 65 In other words, the act of vot-
ing or the issue voted upon are afforded lexical priority and
are not weighed against conventional costs. Still others offer
modified explanations of rationality that are consistent with
the decision to vote. 166
161. See A. DowNs, supra note 29, at 260-76; H. MARGOLIS, supra note 7, at
82-88; G. TULLOCK, TOWARD A MATHEMATICS OF POLITICS 110-12 (1967); see also
Salkever, Who Knows Whether It's Rational to Vote?, 90 ETHICS 203, 204 (1980).
162. See H. MARGOLIS, supra note 7, at 84. Of course, winning and losing are
not the only returns associated with voting. Margolis also discusses demonstra-
tive benefits, consumption benefits, and psychic benefits.
163. A. DOWNS, supra note 29.
164. See, e.g., Riker & Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 25 (1968); Strom, On the Apparent Paradox of Participation: A New Proposal,
69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 908 (1975). See generally Salkever, supra note 161, at 205.
165. See Meehl, The Selfish loter Paradox and the Thrown-away Vote Argument, 71
AM. POL. SCi. REV. 11 (1977). See generally Salkever, supra note 161, at 206-07.
166. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Fiorina, The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision-Theoretic
Analysis, 68 AM. POL. SC. REV. 525 (1974); Salkever, supra note 161.
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Professor Harold Margolis offers a particularly promis-
ing explanation.167 He asserts that voting, as well as a broad
range of altruistic behavior, can be viewed as rational simply
by expanding the breadth of the voter's interests. In partic-
ular, if the voter is viewed as allocating resources not merely
for his or her own narrowly defined interests, but also for
the interests of others, the calculation of expected marginal
benefits from voting changes dramatically. For example, if
the voter is interested in the plight of the poor or elderly,
and votes for a candidate who will increase spending on so-
cial programs, the potential differences can range into bil-
lions of dollars. Although the probability that the
individual's vote will determine the outcome remains minis-
cule, the expected marginal benefit increases markedly-
quite possibly to the point at which it exceeds marginal
cost. 168
The decision to vote is analogous to a decision to buy a
good or service. It involves a willingness to absorb a cost-
pay a price-for taking a particular action.169 Voting, how-
ever, forces us to seek explanations that lie outside of nar-
row self-interest. Is it possible that voting is merely an
exception to an otherwise consistent pattern of self-interest-
induced market and nonmarket transactions? This seems
unlikely when a transaction, like voting, has the capacity to
affect the fortunes of others, and is therefore likely to be in-
fluenced by one's values concerning how others should be
treated. This is precisely why the narrow self-interest as-
sumption is illogical in the context of the economic analysis
of law. One individual's willingness or desire to affect the
welfare of another, with or without the other's consent, is at
the heart of a decision to take or forego action in the "mar-
kets" about which the economic analysis of law is concerned.
These decisions, though perhaps market-like in form, are
closer in substance to the "social choice" decisions of
voting. 170
167. See H. MARGOLIS, supra note 7.
168. Id. at 88-95.
169. Whether voting or buying a traditional good, the buyer must decide to
forego mutually exclusive opportunities. This is the "opportunity cost," and is
the actual cost of any decision.
170. The decision of whether to vote is distinguishable from the decision of how
to vote. The latter may be influenced by many factors not affecting market
choices. See generally Buchanan, Individual Choice and the Market, 62 J. POL. ECON.
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2. Solidarity and Group Dynamics
Behavior that is consistent with group goals often ap-
pears to be inconsistent with the personal welfare of the in-
dividual actor. Acts of heroism,1 7' crowd behavior, 72 labor
union strikes, 173 the formation of cooperatives 74 and com-
munes, 175 and transactions in which the parties share the
fruits of their exchange in a manner that does not reflect
their relative power, 176 are examples of behavior that strain
the narrow self-interest paradigm. One possibility is that the
group's goals or values are lexically prior to the individual's
self-serving goals. The question of lexical priority is raised
with respect to a variety of solidarity concepts, including the
Rastafarian notion of "I 'n' I,"' 77 Durkheim's "conscious
collective,"'' 78 Freud's "oceanic feeling,"'' 79 and the Japa-
334 (1954). In particular, we may vote according to generalized "values" and
make market choices on the basis of individual tastes. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 18, 81-83 (1963); Buchanan, supra, at 336; Jef-
frey, Preferences Among Preferences, 71 J. PHIL. 377 (1974). In actuality, the factors
influencing how one votes also probably account for the decision to vote at all.
Law and economics seems to occupy a middle ground in which market-type trans-
actions involving fundamental values take place. The choices made, though mar-
ket-like in character, are likely, therefore, to be influenced by broader values.
171. See, e.g., J. BIERMAN, RIGHTEOUS GENTILE: THE STORY OF RAOUL WAL-
LENBERG, MISSING HERO OF THE HOLOCAUST (1981); I. MORRIS, THE NOBILITY OF
FAILURE: TRAGIC HEROES IN THE HISTORY OFJAPAN (1975); HEROES-U.S. MARINE
CORPS. 1861-1955 U. Blakeney ed. 1957).
172. See, e.g., G. LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND (1897).
173. See, e.g., B. KARSH, DIARY OF A STRIKE (1958); R. LUXEMBURG, THE MASS
STRIKE (Torchbook ed. 1971); C. WRIGHT, THE BATrLES OF LABOR (1906). See
generally Booth, supra note 154; Roemer, supra note 12.
174. See P. CASSELMAN, THE COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT AND SOME OF ITS
PROBLEMS (1952); Bogardus, Why Consumers Co-operate: Seventeen Points, 26 Soc. &
Soc. RESEARCH 352 (1942). See generally D. FUNK, GROUP DYNAMIC LAW 366-415
(1982).
175. For an economic analysis, see D. COLLARD, supra note 15, at 80-89. See
generally P. ABRAMS, COMMUNES, SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIETY (1976); B. BERGER, THE
SURVIVAL OF A COUNTERCULTURE (1981); R. FAIFIELD, COMMUNES, U.S.A. (1972);
D. HAYDEN, SEVEN AMERICAN UTOPIAS (1976); Cornfield, The Success of Urban Com-
munes, 45J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 115 (1983); Naitove & Nichols, Special Section on
Law Communes: The Simple Life Isn't that Simple, 2 JURIS DOCTOR, Oct. 1972, at 38;
Rothschild-Whitt, The Collectivist Organization: An Alternative to Rational Bureaucratic
Models, 44 AM. Soc. REV. 509 (1979).
176. See infra text accompanying notes 190-97.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
178. See E. DURKHEIM, supra note 6, at 79-82.
179. S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, in 21 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 64-65 (J. Strachey ed. 1961).
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nese phenomenon of wa or group harmony."'
When group interests are not lexically prior to self-in-
terest, another issue arises: Is adherence to the goals of the
group a means of achieving self-interested goals, or is group
welfare itself an end? 18 1 This issue can be analyzed in the
context of a familiar game theory construct, the prisoner's
dilemma. 18 2 The dilemma involves two prisoners who are
separated without communication and charged with a crime.
They are each faced with a choice of confessing or not con-
fessing. If both confess, they will each receive sentences of
five years. If both refuse to confess, they will each receive
sentences of one year. If one confesses and the other does
not, the confessor will be freed and the other will receive a
twenty-year sentence. 18 3
The matrix in Figure IV illustrates the quandary. The
numbers in the upper right of each cell reflect the outcomes
for Prisoner B and the lower left foretells the fate of Prisoner
A. From the standpoint of Prisoner A: if Prisoner B con-
fesses, and A also confesses, prisoner A will be sentenced to
five years; if A does not confess, he will be sentenced to
twenty years; if B does not confess, and A does confess, A
will be freed; if A does not confess he will receive a one-year
sentence. Regardless of A's assumption about B's strategy,
the strategy that minimizes his sentence is to confess. Con-
fession is also B's optimal choice, because he faces the same
choices and outcomes as A. Consequently, both parties will
confess, and each will receive a five-year sentence.
Is there a way around the prisoner's dilemma, so that
both parties will refuse to confess, and therefore receive
180. Wagatsuma & Rosett, Cultural Attitudes Towards Contract Law: Japan and the
United States Compared, 2 PAC. BASIN L.J. 76, 85-86 (1983); see also Hiroshi, Some
Cultural Assumptions Among the Japanese, 31 JAPAN Q 371 (1984); Takeyoshi, The
Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan, 7 LAW JAPAN 1 (1974).
181. Compare M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) and Note, A
Note on Collective Action, Marxism and the Prisoner's Dilemma, supra note 12, with Roe-
mer, supra note 12 and Note, Mass Action, supra note 12. See also R. UNGER, supra
note 23, at 206-07.
182. See generally R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); C.
GOETZ, supra note 18, at 12-17; R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS
(1957); A. RAPOPORT & A. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA: A STUDY IN CONFLICT
AND COOPERATION (1965); Harrison, Strategy and Biology: The Continuing Interest in
Self-Interest, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1986).
183. These outcomes are similar to those found in Sen, Behavior, supra note 15,
at 249-51.
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FIGURE IV
STRATEGIES AND OUTCOMES
FOR PRISONER B
Confess Do Not Confess
5 20
Confess
5 0
STRATEGIES
AND OUTCOMES
FOR PRISONER A
0
Do Not
Confess
201
one-year sentences? Actually, there are two possible ave-
nues. The first, as explained by Amartya Sen, is learning to
achieve individual goals by pretending not to be self-inter-
ested.'8 4 In terms of the game, this approach would require
not confessing; one prisoner would appear to be helping the
other. If both adopt this strategy, then each will receive a
one-year sentence. Thus, they achieve their self-interested
goals by acting altruistically. The other route to the same
outcome demands no pretense. It requires the actual inter-
nalization of the group's goals, 8 5 the deliberate recognition
of the costs and benefits to others resulting from one's own
decision.
A great deal of experimental evidence supports the idea
that people learn to adopt a non-self-interested stance in or-
der to reach favorable outcomes.'8 6 Generally, experiments
184. Id. at 252-53.
185. But see Note, A ,Vote on Collective Action, Marxism and the Prisoner's Dilemma,
supra note 12. See generally Booth, supra note 154; Roemer, supra note 12; Note,
Aass Action, supra note 12.
186. See, e.g., R. AXELROD, supra note 182; A. RAPAPORT & A. CHAMMAH, supra
note 182; Allman, NVice Guys Finish First, 5 SCIENCE 25 (1984); Hardin, Collective
Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoners' Dilemma, 16 BEHAVIORAL Sci. 472 (1971); Lave, An
Empirical Approach to the Prisoners' Dilemma Game, 76 QJ. EcoN. 424 (1962); Rapo-
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in this area entail repeated plays of the prisoner's dilemma
game and immediate rewards. The players eventually learn
that cooperation is the best route to achieving their personal
goals. Of course, the fact that self-interest-based goals are
reached by consciously pretending not to be self-interested
does not discredit the narrow self-interest assumption.
The critical question is whether all instances of coopera-
tion are the result of "learning to play the game," or
whether some instances involve a sense of solidarity and the
actual internalization of group goals. Obviously, an answer
either way in any particular case of group-oriented behavior
is not likely to be empirically verifiable. There are, however,
numerous individual actions, ranging from acts of heroism
to participation in volunteer community programs, that are
extremely difficult to justify on the basis of the immediate or
eventual rewards which are likely to accrue to the individual
actor. In particular, theories based on the possibility that in-
dividuals learn to act "as if" they are not self-interested, in
order to achieve narrow individual goals, are unsatisfactory
when conduct entails individual peril, is either the first or an
isolated event of a particular kind, or when the individual
knows the event will occur a predetermined number of
times.' l 7 The internalization of group goals seems well-doc-
umented in social movements,' including the American la-
bor movement. 89
port & Chammah, Sex Differences in Factors Contributing to the Level of Cooperation in the
Prisoner's Dilemma Game, 2J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 831 (1965); Wilson,
Reciprocation and Other Techniques for Inducing Cooperation in the Prisoner s Dilemma
Game, 15 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 167 (1971).
187. As noted earlier, see supra text accompanying note 186, under experimen-
tal conditions, actors in the prisoner's dilemma frequently learn to cooperate and
achieve a state of reciprocal altruism. See R. AXELROD, supra note 182. These ex-
periments typically include repeated interactions. Obviously, when the players
encounter each other only once, they have no opportunity to develop a climate of
reciprocity. In addition, if the players know how many times they will interact, the
last encounter is like a single encounter and cooperation is unlikely. If the actors
do not expect to cooperate on the final repetition, there is also little reason to
cooperate on the next to last repetition and so on up the line. Id. at 92-93.
188. B. BROMMEL, EUGENE V. DEBS: SPOKESMAN FOR LABOR AND SOCIALISM
(1978); M. DORMAN, WE SHALL OVERCOME (1964); L. GARA, THE LIBERTY LINE:
THE LEGEND OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD (1961); M. KING, STRIDE TOWARD
FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY STORY (1958); E. PANKHURST, THE SUFFRAGETTE:
THE HISTORY OF THE WOMEN'S MILITANT SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT (1970); 0. ScoTr,
THE SECRET SIX: JOHN BROWN AND THE ABOLITIONIST MOVEMENT (1979); Crozier,
Reflections on Violence, 33 NATIONAL REV. 656 (1981).
189. See, e.g., B. KARSH, supra note 173; A. LINDSEY, THE PULLMAN STRIKE: THE
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Recent experimental results verify the allegiance indi-
viduals feel toward group goals. Professors Elizabeth Hoff-
man and Mathew Spitzer offer particularly interesting results
in this regard.'9 0 In a series of experiments, they presented
groups of two persons with several alternatives, each having
varying payoffs for the individuals and for the group as a
whole. During their experiments, they randomly selected
one of the individuals involved, the "controller," to make
the actual choice.191 The alternative offering the highest
payoff for this individual differed from the one that would
maximize the payoff for the other group member or for the
group as a whole. The nonchoosing individual was permit-
ted to influence the choice of the controller through en-
forceable side-payment agreements.
Hoffman and Spitzer found that, approximately ninety
percent of the time, the individuals were able to make an
agreement that resulted in choosing the alternative that
maximized the payoff for the group. 192 More surprising was
the nature of the agreements made to achieve this outcome.
One would expect self-interested controllers to demand in-
dividual outcomes that would at least equal their best indi-
vidual payoff available among the choices. In fact, there was
a far greater tendency for the controller to choose the
group-maximizing alternative and to take a share of the total
payoff that was less than that available from the other alter-
natives. 193 More recently, Hoffman and Spitzer varied the
method of choosing the controller as well as the degree of
the controller's apparent moral authority. 19 4 Although these
changes in design affected the division of the group's in-
come, two results persisted. First, the individuals consist-
STORY OF A UNIQUE EXPERIMENT AND OF A GREAT LABOR UPHEAVAL (1964); C.
WRIGHT, supra note 173; Booth, supra note 154; Lynd, Comnmunal Rights, 62 TEX. L.
REV. 1417, 1423-30 (1984); Note, ilass Action, supra note 12.
190. See materials cited supra note 117.
191. Hoffman & Spitzer, Coase, supra note 117, at 82. They conducted three-
person experiments as well.
192. Id. at 91.
193. Id. at 91-93. Hoffman and Spitzer note the possibility that a feeling of
kinship, stemming from the fact that their subjects were students, may be respon-
sible for these results.
194. Hoffman & Spitzer, Entitlements, supra note 117. They chose the controller
either randomly or through a game competition. They varied the controller's ap-
parent moral authority by altering the wording that defined who was to be the
controller. Id. at 267-72.
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ently arrived at the group-maximizing outcome. Second, the
division of the group payoff was typically inconsistent with
what would be expected if the parties behaved in a purely
self-interested manner. 195
3. Expanded Interests and Efficiency
Whether for ideological reasons or otherwise, altruism
has had little effect on the economic analysis of law.' 96 This
result seems paradoxical because the existence of a system
of laws essentially designed to control and promote the shar-
ing of power, "as if" people were altruistic, may be evidence
of a collective aspiration to altruism.' 97 Contract law's con-
cern with limiting bargaining power is an especially good ex-
ample of this. 198 More important, if we assume that man is
narrowly self-interested, but he is, in truth, altruistic, at-
tempts to design efficient laws are likely to go awry.
When individuals respond to the well-being of others in
making their decisions, they act as though they are internal-
izing what economists call externalitites. 99 For example, in
determining the desirability of my action or, more precisely,
what I will pay in order to take that action, I may consider
my own costs and benefits and the perceived impact of the
action on others. An important complicating factor is that
the costs and benefits to others may not be given as much
weight as the costs and benefits to me. In other words, I
may be influenced more by my personal gain than by altru-
ism. Therefore, the influence of altruism on my decision de-
pends on my perception of the impact of my action on
195. Id. at 275-80. Hoffman and Spitzer conclude that the participants were
Lockean in character because they seemed to be guided less by self-interest than
by some notion of desert in dividing the group payoff. Id. at 280-84.
196. An important exception is Landes & Posner, Salvors, supra note 60.
197. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1722 (1976); see also I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY
INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 93 (1980).
198. I. MACNEIL, supra note 197, at 84-102; Kennedy, supra note 197, at 1719;
see also Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829 (1983);
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983).
199. The "internalization" I speak of here does not mean that your fortune or
misfortune becomes my fortune or misfortune. I am able to separate my interests
from yours, but I take yours into consideration in my decisionmaking. If I did not
sense this separation, the narrow self-interest assumption would seem to hold. I
believe this distinction is also made by Landes & Posner, Salvors, supra note 60, at
93-100.
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others and on some measure of altruistic intensity.200 Altru-
istic intensity is a measure of the degree of obligation I feel
toward those affected by the particular action. It is likely to
depend on cultural factors, genetic closeness, and a host of
determinants of group cohesion.20'
Altruism increases the difficulty of employing efficiency
standards 20 2 in the development of public policy. One effi-
ciency criterion that is particularly germane to public policy
and especially vulnerable to problems raised by altruism is
the Kaldor-Hicks formulation.03 Under the Kaldor-Hicks
standard, the gains to those benefiting from an involuntary
transfer are compared with the losses of those who are in-
jured.20 4 The transfer is considered efficient if the gains are
200. See D. COLLARD, supra note 15, at 14; Kennedy, supra note 197, at 1718.
201. See generally H. BONNER, GROUP DYNAMICS 66-126 (1959); T. GURR, WHY
MEN REBEL (1970); A. HARE, HANDBOOK OF SMALL GROUP RESEARCH (2d ed.
1976); GROUP DYNAMICS 401-43 (D. Cartwright & A. Zander eds. 1968);
Berkowitz & Daniels, Affecting the Salience of the Social Responsibility Norm: Effects of
Past Help on the Response to Dependency Relationships, 68 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSY-
CHOLOGY 275 (1964); Good & Nelson, Effects of Person-Group and Intragroup Attitude
Similarity on Perceived Group Attractiveness and Cohesiveness (pt. I), 25 PSYCHONOMIC
SCi. 215 (1971); Good & Nelson, Effects of Person-Group and Intragroup Attitude Simi-
larity on Perceived Group Attractiveness and Cohesiveness (pt. H), 33 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP.
551 (1973); Lott, Group Cohesiveness: A Learning Phenomenon, 55 J. SOC. PSYCHOLOGY
275 (1961); O'Hara & Wood, Patterns of Awareness: Consciousness and the Group Mind,
6 GESTALT J. 103 (1983); Stokes, Toward an Understanding of Cohesion in Personal
Change Groups, 33 INT'L J. GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 449 (1983); Tyerman & Spen-
cer, A Critical Test of the Sherifs' Robber's Cave Experiments: Intergroup Competition and
Cooperation Between Groups of Well-Acquainted Individuals, 14 SMALL GROUP BEHAVIOR
515 (1983).
202. See generally Dyke, The Vices of Altruism, 81 ETHICS 241 (1971).
203. See Hicks, The Valuation of Social Income, 7 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 105 (1940);
Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49
ECON. J. 549 (1939). See generally Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange and Auction: Philo-
sophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 237-42 (1980);
Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 513-14
(1980).
204. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion provides a means of evaluating involuntary
transfers. The competing "Pareto efficiency" criterion would not permit involun-
tary transfers, and thus is seriously limited as a policy tool. "Pareto efficiency" is,
however, an important concept for private contract law. When altruism is in-
volved, exchanges will include a pure exchange component and a gift component.
If one adopts the view that altruism need not be the result of the interdependen-
cies of utilities, then most gift-giving would be inefficient from a Pareto standpoint
because it would involve a decision by the giver to accept a lesser position in order
to benefit others.
If one adopts the egoist view that all gift-giving is explained by utility interde-
pendencies, altruism still creates a question whether Pareto superior results will
prevail. The primary problem is that the satisfaction I expect to derive from help-
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sufficient to allow those benefiting to compensate those in-
jured, whether or not compensation actually takes place. 205
The complexity that altruism introduces can be illus-
trated by the classic case of externalities: environmental
pollution. The Kaldor-Hicks approach could call for penal-
ties that are equal to the social cost of discharging wastes
into the air or water. This social cost might be measured by
the decline in property values in the area surrounding the
polluter. Assuming there are no other effects, it is "effi-
cient" to discharge wastes if the costs of stopping the dis-
charge exceed the decline in property values caused by the
pollution. By assessing a penalty equal to the social cost, the
policymaker could insure that only Kaldor-Hicks-efficient
pollution takes place, whether or not the fine is distributed
to those suffering the losses. 20 6
Suppose I am faced with deciding whether or not to pol-
lute. If altruism plays a role, my decision will be colored by
a propensity-perhaps as a result of my membership in the
Sierra Club, the presence of relatives in the area, the fact
that the area is populated by a group for which I have a par-
ticular affinity, or the belief that I do not deserve the maxi-
mum gain-to defer to the interests of others. The effect
will be to offset what I would be willing to pay on the basis of
personal gain alone. Unless I am absolutely selfish, any
rules designed to encourage efficient involuntary transfers
will be superimposed over an internal, independent system
of cost-benefit analysis that is a product of my sense of obli-
gation to others. 20 7
ing another may be based on false information. See D. COLLARD, supra note 15, at
131; cf. Kelman, Choices and Utility, supra note 7, at 784-87.
205. This is only efficient in the sense of maximizing wealth. It does not mean
that overall well-being or utility has been maximized. See Coleman, Efficiency, Util-
ity and Wealth Maximization, supra note 203, at 518-20, 525-26.
206. The goal here is to insure that the right to pollute, or to be protected
from pollution, ends up in the hands of the party valuing it the most. When that
happens, those gaining would gain enough to compensate those losing. The ac-
tual fine in the Kaldor-Hicks case is irrelevant, except as a means for assuring that
the "right" party does in fact "win."
207. In addition to responding to others' losses, I may have a general aversion
to forcing others to make involuntary transfers, even if I have been assured that
such an action is efficient from the standpoint of narrow self-interest. If I am
assured that the calculated social cost is accurate and will be distributed to the
"losers," the risk that this will not be the case, and my aversion to involuntary
transfers, may still reduce the value I place on the activity.
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The analysis is further complicated because the decision
I make based on what I believe to be your well-being may be
wrong simply because I am required to guess about what is
in your interest. Moreover, I may rely to some extent on
some outward manifestation of your preference, and your
expression may be purposely misleading or influenced by
your own altruism. Thus, there are layers of overlapping
cost-benefit analyses involving individuals with different al-
truistic intensities and estimates of what is in the interest of
the objects of their altruism.2 08 Attempting to develop a sys-
tem of "efficient" rules on the basis of minimal information
is as futile as making a manual adjustment to a cooling sys-
tem while unaware of the temperature.
The layering of cost-benefit analyses does not render
economic analysis impotent, but it does magnify the risks of
relying upon the narrow self-interest assumption. Economic
models must incorporate altruism-including the critical
feature of intensity-into their structures. 209 Even assuming
some fixed level of nonselfish behavior for all analysis would
be more realistic than assuming a complete absence of altru-
ism across the board. 21 0 Without recognition of altruism,
economic analysis of the socio-legal marketplace, especially
by those who equate moral rightness with efficiency, seems
dangerously primitive.21
III. MARKET ILLUSIONS
It is axiomatic that a normative theory based on effi-
ciency or on the maximization of utility presupposes some
reliable means of ascertaining preferences or, at least, of
208. The most extreme but unlikely possibility is the "after-you" problem, in
which the world grinds to a halt as we all stand aside in order to allow others to
express their self-interested preferences. See D. COLLARD, supra note. 15, at 9;
Dyke, supra note 202, at 252.
209. For some important recent work, see D. COLLARD, supra note 15; F. PRYOR,
supra note 47; Arrow, supra note 81; Dyke, supra note 202; Kennet, supra note 155;
Kolm, supra note 155; Radar, The Second Theorem of Welfare Economics When Utilities
are Interdependent, 23J. ECON. THEORY 420 (1980).
210. It is common in economics to include one's family in the concept of self. I
would not consider this altruism, for the reasons discussed supra note 15.
211. Geneticists, anthropologists, and social psychologists have commented
extensively on the strength of altruistic motivations. See citations supra notes
149-54. For an especially interesting proposal concerning the use of genetic in-
formation, seeJ. BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW: THE BIOLOGY OF AL-
TRUISM IN THE COURTROOM OF THE FUTURE (1985).
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making reasonable inferences about them.2 12 Economists
generally offer a simple and seemingly "objective" means of
satisfying this requirement. They determine preferences by
observing the choices made-typically, market choices. The
simplicity ends here. The market is clouded by illusions
stemming from both general problems of equating choice
with preference and specific problems of using value as a
measure of preference.
A. Choices and Preferences When Others Are Involved The
Prisoner's Dilemma Again
In the prisoner's dilemma introduced earlier,21 3 the
rational strategy for both parties was to confess-a decision
that resulted in five-year sentences for both prisoners. I in-
dicated two ways of escaping the dilemma.21 4 The more rel-
evant prospect in the context of altruism is the
internalization of group goals by the decision-makers. They
will not confess and will recieve one-year sentences.
But what happens when individuals remain singlemind-
edly self-interested? If both parties seem to act irrationally
and choose as if they were only interested in the welfare of
each other, they again will not confess and will receive one-
year sentences. 2 15 This bit of acting is not easy. In the pris-
oner's dilemma, a prisoner pretending not to be self-inter-
ested plays directly into the hands of the other prisoner.
Experimental evidence suggests that despite the risk
and temptation involved, individuals are quite capable of
learning to cooperate, even without direct communication
or any kind of binding agreement, in order to achieve a su-
perior outcome.2 16 This does not mean the individuals are
less self-interested. They do, however, learn to make
choices that appear less self-interested as a means of achiev-
ing their self-interest based goals. Naturally, motivational
orientation plays a role in developing the trust necessary to
212. This is not meant to imply that maximizing total utility can be equated
with maximizing wealth. See Coleman, Efficieno,, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic
Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, supra note 203, at 237-47.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 182-85.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 184-85.
215. This discussion relies on the work of Amartya Sen. See Sen, Behavior, supra
note 15, at 249-53.
216. See studies cited supra note 186.
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adopt the cooperative strategy while relying on one's "oppo-
nent" to do the same. 2 17 Thus, individuals who believe it is
unnecessary to defeat their opponent in order to achieve
their own goals are faster learners. 218
For those attempting to determine preferences by ob-
serving choices, the inconsistency between motive and result
is a discouraging phenomenon. The choice observed-in
this case not confessing-does not appear to be the right
choice for a rationally self-interested person whose prefer-
ence is to receive the lightest sentence possible. Moreover,
this seemingly irrational choice turns out to be far superior
to the rationally self-interested choice of confessing. As
Amartya Sen has noted, the rational participants pay for
their rationality with extra years in prison. 2 19
The prisoner's dilemma is only one example of a class
of deceptions-those created from strategic behavior-that
plays havoc with attempts to determine preferences by ob-
serving choices. More commonly known and perhaps more
directly related to market decisions are the strategies and
deceptions involved in bargaining. Anyone who has bar-
gained over the price of an automobile knows that self-inter-
ested goals seem to be served best when as little as possible
about actual preference is revealed. In fact, avoiding disclo-
sure seems to be a fundamental tenet of bargaining.2 20 The
fact that a bargain is eventually struck tells us very little
about preference. We merely know that one price is accept-
able to both buyer and seller rather than how highly each
actually values the subject matter of the transaction. A simi-
lar deception also plagues attempts to allocate expenditures
for public goods on the basis of the amounts individuals say
217. See Deutsch, The Effect of Motivational Orientation upon Trust and Suspicion, 13
HUMAN RELATIONS 123 (1960); Deutsch, Trust and Suspicion, 2J. CONFLICT RESOLU-
TION 265 (1958).
218. Cf Deutsch, Trust and Suspicion, supra note 217, at 270-72. The success of
nonadversarial forms of dispute resolution, in the context of existing relation-
ships, can likely be explained by the existence of relatively high levels of trust. See
Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 32-34 (1982). This is not to
say, however, that commercial contexts are incapable of fostering a similar coop-
erative attitude. See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
219. Sen, Behavior, supra note 15, at 250.
220. The importance of bluffing in the context of the "chicken game" is dis-
cussed in C. GOETZ, supra note 18, at 17-32.
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they would be willing to pay. 221
B. Framing and Preference Reversals
Recent discoveries in the field of cognitive psychology
illustrate additional problems associated with relying on
choices as preference indicators. A primary discovery is that
people may reverse their expressions of preferences de-
pending upon how an issue is presented to them.222
For example, subjects in one experiment were told to
assume that a disease outbreak in the United States was ex-
pected to kill 600 people.223  They were, then asked to
choose between two programs:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If
Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability
that 600 people will be saved, and a two-thirds
probability that no people will be saved.
In the experiment, subjects preferred Program A by almost a
three-to-one margin. 224 With the same introductory facts,
the choices were then presented slightly differently:
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. If Program
D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody
will die, and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will
die.
221. Determining the proper supply of public goods is difficult, because people
are often reluctant to reveal their preference when there is a possibility of being a
"free rider." See supra note 158. Several writers have made proposals for methods
that might induce revelation of preferences. See, e.g., Clarke, Multipact Pricing of
Public Goods, 11 PUBLIC CHOICE 17 (1971); Margolis, A Thought Experiment on De-
mand-Revealing Mechanisms, 38 PUBLIC CHOICE 87 (1982); Tideman & Tullock, A
New and Superior Process for Making Social Choice, 84J. POL. ECON. 1145 (1976). Re-
garding the pervasiveness of the free-rider problem, see articles by Marwell and
Ames cited supra note 157.
222. See, e.g., Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, Knowing What You Want: Measur-
ing Labile Values, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN CHOICE AND DECISION BEHAVIOR 117
(T. Wallsten ed. 1980); Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, supra note
17; Kahneman & Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, supra note 17; Knetsch &
Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Un-
expected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Qj. ECON. 507 (1984); Lindman, Inconsis-
tent Preferences Among Gambles, 89 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 390 (1971);
Machina, "Expected Utility "Analysis Without the Independence Axiom, 50 ECONOMETRICA
277 (1982); Russell & Thaler, supra note 8; Slovic & Lichtenstein, Preference Rever-
sals: A Broader Perspective, 73 Am. ECON. REV. 596; Thaler, Illusions and Mirages in
Public Policy, 73 PUB. INTEREST 60 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Thaler, Illusions];
versky & Kahneman, Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE
453 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Fversky & Kahneman, Psychology of Choice].
223. See Tversky & Kahneman, Psychology of Choice, supra note 222, at 453.
224. Id.
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In this case, subjects preferred Program D by more than a
three-to-one margin. 22 5 In both cases the choices were sub-
stantively identical. In Programs A and C, 200 people live
and 400 people die. In Programs B and D, the expected sur-
vival rate is 200.
The preference reversal demonstrated in this particular
experiment was a result of what psychologists call "fram-
ing." 2 26 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, pioneers in
this field, explain that the framing here elicited a response
that was consistent with the fact that people are generally
more averse to risks involving gains than to risks involving
losses. 227 In the disease hypothetical, the first two choices
were framed in terms of gains-people saved; the second
two choices were framed in terms of losses-people dying.
And the results followed the expected pattern. 228
Framing evokes different responses to objectively indis-
tinguishable stimuli. For example, the holder of a losing lot-
tery ticket that misses winning by one digit is likely to be
more disappointed than the holder of a lottery ticket on
which no numbers match the winning combination. 229 Simi-
larly, missing an airplane flight by five minutes is more frus-
trating than missing a flight by an hour.230 In both cases,
individuals select a reference point-winning or losing the
lottery, catching or missing the flight-and use that point as
the basis for their response. Variations in feelings of frustra-
tion and regret follow even though the actual outcomes are
identical. 23 '
225. Id.
226. See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, supra note 17, at
343-44; Kahneman & Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, supra note 17, at 167;
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 222, at 456-57.
227. See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, supra note 17, at
341-43; Tversky & Kahneman, Psychology of Choice, supra note 222, at 453-55. See
generally Friedman & Savage, Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL.
ECON. 274 (1948).
228. See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, supra note 17, at 343;
see also Arrow, Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 1
(1982).
229. Kahneman & Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, supra note 17, at 170.
230. Id.
231. Id.; see also Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, I J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 39, 51-54 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Thaler, Positive
Theory]. Tversky and Kahneman compare the framing of choices to the dilemma
of determining the relative heights of two mountains from various vantage points.
As one's perspective changes, the apparent relative heights of the mountains may
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An especially intriguing manifestation of changing per-
spective involves self-control and changes in preferences as
the time frame is altered. 232 For example, my morning deci-
sion not to gorge myself on pastry that day may change
when I walk by the pastry shop in the afternoon. Recogniz-
ing this, I may decide not to walk down the street where the
pastry shop is located.233 Richard Thaler suggests that this
phenomenon reveals two sets of preferences: one as "plan-
ner" and one as "doer." 23 4 Framing exposes these dual
preference structures and reveals the link between choices
and the role played at a particular moment.
This important body of research forces one to question
whether any efficiency-based public policy requiring the as-
certainment of preferences can be more than guesswork. 235
One possible response is to discount preference reversals as
irrational. 23 6 This response, however, saves the choices-re-
appear to vary. See Tversky & Kahneman, Psychology of Choice, supra note 222, at
457.
In a particularly interesting and important study, patients' medical treatment
preferences changed according to how the alternatives were framed. See McNeill,
Pauker, Sox & Tversky, On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1259 (1982).
232. SeeJ. ELSTER, supra note 7, at 36-111; Ainslie, Specious Reward, 82 PsYcHo-
LOGICAL BULL. 463 (1975); Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Max-
imization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165 (1955-56); Thaler, Illusions, supra note 222, at
66-71; Thaler, Positive Theory, supra note 231, at 54-57; Thaler & Shefrin, An Eco-
nomic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J. POL. EcON. 392 (1981); Tversky & Kahneman,
Psychology of Choice, supra note 222, at 457-58.
233. See Thaler, Illusions, supra note 222, at 66-67; Thaler, Positive Theory, supra
note 231, at 55. The decision to avoid a future temptation is called precommit-
ment. See Strotz, supra note 232, at 173; Thaler, Positive Theory, supra note 231, at
55. The example used by Strotz and others is based on Ulysses' attempts to pre-
pare for the call of the Sirens in THE ODYSSEY. See Strotz, supra note 232, at 165;J.
ELSTER, supra note 7, at 36; Thaler, Positive Theory, supra note 231, at 55; Tversky &
Kahneman, Psychology of Choice, supra note 222, at 457.
234. Thaler, Positive Theory, supra note 231, at 55-56.
235. Economists are generally reluctant to accept the possibility that prefer-
ence reversals are not minor short-term aberrations from "rational" decision
processes. See Russell & Thaler, supra note 8; Slovic & Lichtenstein, supra note
222. The testing, however, has been rigorous, and the reversal phenomenon re-
mains. See Grether & Ploh, Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phe-
nomenon, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 623 (1979); Knetsch & Sinden, supra note 222;
Pommerehne, Schneider & Zweifel, Economic Theory of Choice and Preference Reversal
Phenomenon: A Reexamination, 72 AM. EcoN. REV. 509 (1982); Reilly, Preference Re-
versals: Further Evidence and Some Suggested Modifications in Experimental Design, 72 AM.
EcoN. REV. 576 (1982).
236. In particular, preference reversals violate the condition of "invariance,"
which suggests that the ordering of preferences should not be a function of the
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veal-preferences assumption only at the expense of the ra-
tionality assumption. Furthermore, calling this behavior
irrational is inappropriate because some theories of rational-
ity accommodate this type of behavior.2 37 Moreover,
whether irrational or rational by some standard, the prob-
lem remains the same: Observations of choice may tell us
far less about preferences than the use of efficiency criteria
requires us to know.
C. The Wealth Effect
The most commonly cited hazard of relying on expres-
sions of value to ascertain the strength of an individual's
preferences is the "wealth effect." 23 8 The wealth effect oc-
curs when the amount I am willing to pay for something is a
function of my wealth. In the economic analysis of law, the
wealth effect is typically viewed in terms of how the posses-
sion or non-possession of a particular entitlement affects the
value I attach to it. For example, suppose I have a pano-
ramic view of the beach from my house, and, because of zon-
ing or deed restrictions, I have a right to a continuing,
unobstructed view. Assume I am approached and asked for
what price I would be willing to sell my right to an unob-
structed view, and my reply is "$20,000." Or suppose I do
not have a right to the unobstructed view, but am given an
opportunity to buy that right from my neighbor, who has the
right to build a structure between my house and the beach.
If the wealth effect is operating, the amount I am willing to
pay for the right will be less than the amount for which I am
willing to sell it. As Duncan Kennedy has aptly stated, there
is an "offer-asking" problem. 23 9
The wealth effect makes cost-benefit analysis especially
treacherous. For example, what are the benefits of con-
structing a highway? Are they what motorists say they would
be willing to pay to construct the highway, or are they what
motorists would pay to keep the highway if its existence were
manner in which the choices are described. See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Val-
ues and Frames, supra note 17, at 343.
237. See March, supra note 8, at 591-93.
238. See C. GOETZ, supra note 18, at 53;J. KRUTILLA & A. FISHER, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS 30-31 (1975); A. POLINSKY, supra note 18, at
124-25; Baker, supra note 18, at 13; Coleman, supra note 20, at 662-63; Kennedy,
supra note 18.
239. See Kennedy, supra note 18, at 401.
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threatened? The fact that the answers may differ has been
empirically verified. For instance, researchers asked a group
of hunters how much money they would have to be paid
before they would relinquish their hunting rights..2 40 The
average response was an amount over $1000. When the
hunters were asked the maximum they would be willing to
pay before becoming "discouraged" from hunting, the aver-
age response was $247.24 1 If you are the policymaker who
must decide on the value of hunting, which question do you
ask?
The wealth effect is also troublesome for the backbone
of the economic analysis of law, the Coase Theorem. 242 The
effect produces a systematic bias toward the conclusion that
resources have found their way to their most valued uses. 243
The problem is that the subjective perception of the value of
an asset is higher if one already possesses that asset. This
bias reduces the number of instances in which state interven-
tion, for the purpose of reallocating resources to those valu-
ing them most, is regarded as appropriate. 24 4
It is tempting to believe that the wealth effect is present
only when the value of the asset at issue represents a large
portion of total wealth.2 45 At some point wealth limits one's
ability to pay for a resource, but does not effect one's ability
to be compensated. 246 However, the wealth effect is present
even before the amount one is willing to pay is limited by
one's wealth. In fact, recent research suggests that a phe-
nomenon similar to the wealth effect is at work even in the
absence of an impact on total assets.2 47 In these cases, the
value an individual attributes to an item seems to depend
upon the overall composition of his assets.
D. Endowment Effects and Mental Accounting
The strong likelihood that a wealth-effect-type phenom-
240. See J. HAMMACK & G. BROWN, WATERFOWL AND WETLANDS: TOWARD
BIOECONOMIc ANALYSIS 26-28 (1974).
241. Id.
242. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
243. See Baker, supra note 18.
244. Cf Kennedy, supra note 18, at 401.
245. The problem with this approach is pointed out in C. GOETZ, Supra note 18,
at 53.
246. See, e.g., J. KRUTILLA & A. FISHER, supra note 238, at 30.
247. See infra text accompanying notes 248-53.
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enon, called the "endowment effect,"-2 48 will occur, even
when there is little or no change in wealth, has been verified
in experiments involving actual transactions. 249 In one ex-
periment, for example, students entering a room were given
lottery tickets of different colors.2 50 Those receiving tickets
of one color were told they would have to pay two dollars in
order to keep the tickets; those holding the other color were
given the option of keeping the ticket or trading it for two
dollars. Among those who had to pay to keep their tickets,
exactly half did so. Among those who were permitted to
cash in their tickets for two dollars, approximately one-
fourth did S0.25 1 The first group was split evenly over
whether the ticket was worth two dollars; the second group
predominately acted as if the tickets were worth more than
two dollars. Either wealth effects were active even at the
two-dollar level, or inertia was generated simply by the form
of the assets.
The latter possibility was confirmed in a similar experi-
ment, in which members of one group were each given three
dollars, and members of another were each given a ticket.2 52
All were told that the tickets were for a lottery, and the terms
of the lottery were explained. Then, those individuals pos-
sessing tickets were permitted to exchange them for three
dollars, and those who had been given cash were given the
opportunity to buy tickets. Eighty-two percent of those
given tickets elected to keep them, and sixty-three percent of
those given money elected not to exchange it for tickets. 25 3
The tickets were evidently worth more than three dollars to
those who had initially received tickets, but less than three
dollars to those who had initially received money.
Researchers theorize that the reluctance to trade is a re-
sult of a general tendency to undervalue opportunities when
248. I believe the name for this special type of framing was first supplied by
Richard Thaler. See Thaler, Positive Theory, supra note 231, at 44. The problem
arises when the decision-maker views opportunity costs and out-of-pocket costs of
the same magnitude differently. Id.
249. See Knetsch & Sinden, supra note 222. See generally Kelman, Consumption
Theory, supra note 7, at 682-85; Thaler, Illusions, supra note 222, at 61-66; Thaler,
Positive Theory, supra note 231, at 43-47.
250. See Knetsch & Sinden, supra note 222, at 509-11.
251. The results were statistically significant at the .05 level. Id. at 511.
252. See Id. at 512-13. The actual distribution of tickets and money was deter-
mined by drawing.
253. The difference was statistically significant at the .01 level. Id. at 513.
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they are compared to actual out-of-pocket expenses. In
other words, assets that are part of one's endowment, and
would be parted with in a transaction, are given greater
weight than gains that are simply "available." 254 This imbal-
ance may be fueled by a desire to avoid the risk of regret
associated with having made an "incorrect" change. 255
Regret and the tendency to keep different mental asset
accounts256 probably explain one final example. Subjects
were asked to imagine that they had decided to see a play,
and that the admission price was ten dollars.257 Some of the
subjects were told to assume that, upon arrival, they discov-
ered they had lost ten dollars. When asked whether they
would still buy a ticket for the play, eighty-eight percent re-
sponded affirmatively. Other subjects were told to assume
that they had already bought the ticket, but discovered upon
arrival that they had lost it. Only forty-six percent of this
group indicated that they would buy a second ticket.258
Kahneman and Tversky posit that the individuals who lost
the tickets were more likely to see themselves as faced with
the prospect of paying twenty dollars to see the play. Those
losing the ten dollars, on the other hand, did not view the
loss as offsetting whatever gain they had originally received
in their exchange of ten dollars for a ticket. 259 In short, the
254. See Knetsch & Sinden, supra note 222, at 516; Thaler, Positive Theory, supra
note 231, at 43-47. According to Thaler, "the opportunities available are likely
to be viewed as gains while the out-of-pocket expenses are treated as losses.
Thus, the results are consistent with the general tendency to be more averse to
risk associated with gains than with losses." Id. at 44. See generally Kahneman &
Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, supra note 17, at 160-68. Of course, it is the
framing of the question or the experiment that determines whether an action is
viewed as involving a gain or loss.
255. See Kahneman & Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, supra note 17, at
170-71; Kelman, Consumption Theory, supra note 7, at 688-89; Knetsch & Sinden,
supra note 222, at 517. Although Thaler discusses fear of regret as an independ-
ent motivation for not choosing, his analysis suggests that he too would explain
the imbalance of the endowment effect as a desire to avoid making a wrong move.
See Thaler, Positive Theory, supra note 231, at 43-47, 51-54.
256. See generally Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING
Sci. 199 (1985).
257. See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 17, at
347-48.
258. Id. at 347.
259. Id. at 348. This example is reminiscent of another phenomenon called the
"sunk cost effect." See Thaler, Positive Theory, supra note 231, at 47. This effect is
exemplified by the person who pays for membership in a tennis club, is injured,
and then plays in pain because he does not want to "waste" the money spent on
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form, not the quantity, of the loss is critical in the decision.
E. Dangerous Inferences
Strategic behavior, framing, the wealth effect, and the
endowment effect create illusions and undermine the link
between choice and preference. When these distorted
images of preference are used to guide an efficiency-based
public policy, they create an obvious bias in favor of the sta-
tus quo. Unfortunately, no simple prescription will bring ac-
tual preferences into focus. 260 Nor is there any assurance
that knowledge of this bias and a desire to avoid its conse-
quences will result in more effective approaches to public
policy. For if one does not rely on others' choices in making
policy decisions, one must rely on inferences as to what
others' true preferences are. The guessing that takes place
leads inevitably to the very difficult issues of how much
weight, if any, one's preferences concerning the opportuni-
ties 26' and preferences of others 262 should be given.
As an example of the potential temptations, suppose I
greatly enjoy both wine and mystery novels. Even though I
sincerely wish I were not so fond of wine, given a choice be-
tween a twenty-five dollar bottle of wine and a similarly
priced novel, I am indifferent. 263 I may, however, vote for
subsidizing the distribution of reading material to the poor,
but not for the distribution of wine. The most benign possi-
bility is that I am simply making a good faith inference about
poor people's preferences. Another possibility is that my in-
ferences are driven by my paternalistic beliefs about what
membership. The problem is that once the membership is purchased, the only
relevant comparison is between the pleasure and pain of playing. "Sunk cost,"
the cost of membership, however, is not ignored. Mark Kelman offers the alterna-
tive explanation that consumers are motivated by a desire to close transactions.
That is, they want to obtain value for value given. See Kelman, Consumption Theory,
supra note 7, at 691-92.
260. Cf Kennedy, supra note 18, at 401-19. But see Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots:
Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal Entitlementsi 36 STAN. L. REV. 1169,
1178-84 (1984).
261. See, e.g., R. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 138-48
(1979); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 232-39 (1977); Baker, Counting
Preferences in Collective Choice Situations, 25 UCLA L. REV. 381 (1978); Ely, Professor
Dworkin's External/Personal Preference Distinction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 959; Hart, Between
Utility and Rights, 79 COLuM. L. REV. 828 (1979).
262. See Dyke, supra note 202, at 249.
263. This example is suggested by Kelman, Choices and Utility, supra note 7, at
783.
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opportunities should be available or by my preferences for
what the preferences of the poor should be. In short, I may
require behavior from the poor that I do not require of my-
self. Market elitism is thus replaced by a substitute that is
certainly no less elitist or insidious.
CONCLUSION
Eight years ago, Frank Michelman warned that the "vig-
orous weedy propensity" of economic analysis was a threat
to the flowering of other approaches to the analysis of
law. 264 The weeding and pruning in this Article go to the
roots of the economic analysis of law. The tool I have used
is a question: Can the underlying assumptions of economics
support the huge normative weight that the discipline is
asked to bear in its application to law? In particular, do peo-
ple behave self-interestedly, and can we detect their prefer-
ences by observing the things they do?
One version of the self-interest assumption-egoism-
cannot be verified. Moreover, even if egoism is a valid theo-
retical explanation, it does not pierce the psyche sufficiently
to permit any meaningful analysis of our motivational bases.
The narrow self-interest alternative recognizes motivational
influences other than narrow self-interest, but asks us not to
consider them. This approach, though it may work well in
traditional, impersonal markets, is strikingly out of place in
the analysis of law. Law explicitly deals with right and wrong
and the external effects of our actions. Its existence is proof
that we are driven by lexical orderings and the well-being of
others. Any theory that purports to explain what law is or
should be and begins by asking that these things be assumed
away is fundamentally flawed.
The use of economic theory, in the form of cost-benefit
or other efficiency-based analysis, requires some accurate ac-
count of preferences. But observation of market behavior
can lead to inaccurate conclusions. Illusions are produced
by conscious attempts to conceal and by valuation inconsis-
tencies stemming from framing and wealth effects.
What is left of economics in the properly pruned gar-
den? Economics should be admired for its descriptive
264. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic TheorY of Law, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 1015, 1028 (1978).
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beauty. It supplies us with a variety of useful measuring de-
vices, such as cross elasticities, market shares, concentration
ratios, Herfindahl indices, average costs, rates of return on
investment, and debt-equity ratios. To the reader who has
been in a time warp for the last fifteen years, this is familiar
territory. 265 It is what the economic analysis of law means
when it is confined to its proper place. Economics also pro-
vides a way of thinking that is original in the context of law,
but that is the source of the problem. It has become a par-
ticularly virulent form of crabgrass that too many measure
by the ground it covers rather than by any genuine nurturing
it provides. Before we abandon the legal field to economics,
-Ae had better measure more carefully the fertile thought of
other disciplines.
265. Richard Posner calls this the "older" branch of the economic analysis of
law. R. POSNER, supra note 20, at 3-4.
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